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Abstract
In the last twenty years, Brazil has undergone several attempts of improving sustainable
growth through stabilization programmes, and more recently, structural reforms in line
with the Washington Consensus Agenda. The results, however, have been
disappointing, as the per capita output growth has remained below its historic trend, and
poverty and inequality remain at high levels. This paper investigates why market-
oriented reforms such as trade and capital account liberalization, privatization,
deregulation and stabilization failed to boost growth in Brazil. We conclude that
structural reforms may contribute to growth if accompanied by microeconomic policies
tailor-made to address the country’s needs, and by appropriate macroeconomic,
institutional and political environments.
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1 Introduction
Over the last twenty years, Brazil has experienced profound economic changes.
Following the international economic instability of the late 1970s and the debt crisis of
the early 1980s, Brazil launched structural adjustment programmes aimed at solving
external account imbalances and controlling high inflation rates. In 1990, Brazil
undertook a major break from a century-long era of import substitution strategy that left
its economy especially closed towards the end of the 1980s, and introduced economic
reforms involving trade and capital account liberalization, privatization of state
companies, deregulation of markets, and a successful stabilization plan. These reforms
have been reshaping the economy very rapidly and are giving rise to economic
transformations. Table 1 shows, however, that the pre-reform per capita output growth
rate is significantly higher than that of the post-reform period (1990-2002). To the
extent that market-oriented reforms are widely understood to be conducive to growth,
these statistics suggest that something went wrong.
Brazil is a particularly well-suited country to grasping a better understanding of whether
and how market-friendly reforms succeed in developing countries. Although Brazil’s
economy ranks amongst the highest globally in terms of GDP, it remains thoroughly
rooted in the developing world. As in many Latin American countries (e.g. Mexico,
Argentina, Colombia, and Venezuela), Brazil failed to make further consistent progress,
after a period of rapid growth, from the 1980s onwards. Trade liberalization and other
reforms took place in Brazil over a relatively short period of time, and policy changes
were widespread and substantial.
Measuring the success or failure of reforms demands a sensible criterion. Indeed, the
ultimate aim of structural reforms is to foster economic growth. However, in view of the
very uneven income distribution by international standards, and the substantial portion
of population below the poverty line (Table 1), a broader reform achievement criterion
is needed for Brazil, and perhaps for other developing countries as well. In this paper,
the success of reforms is measured according to the performance of the per capita GDP
growth rate, and also to the performance of the inequality and poverty indices before
and after the reforms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief theoretical and empirical
survey of the literature regarding the impacts of structural reforms on economic growth,
income inequality and poverty. Section 3 presents the reforms carried out in Brazil over
the 1990s. Before detailing the policy changes, the political, economic and social
Table 1
Per capita output growth and social indicators - Brazil
Period
Per capita output growth
rate (%)
Percentage of population
below poverty line Gini coefficient
1950s 3.8
1960s 3.0 0.504
1970s 5.5 40.0 0.561
1980s 0.79 43.0 0.592
1990s-2002 0.44 35.5 0.600
Sources: Hoffmann (1992); Population Census; Ipeadata.2
contexts in which reforms were introduced are reviewed. Section 4 assesses whether
and how structural reforms affected social indicators and economic growth in Brazil.
Section 5 discusses why reforms did not fulfil the expectations with regard to social
conditions and output growth. Section 6 presents our final remarks and the lessons that
may be drawn from Brazil’s case for other developing countries.
2 Some theoretical and empirical issues regarding reforms
This survey covers the basic theoretical links between structural reforms and output
growth, inequality, and poverty. Although the focus is on reforms in Brazil, the paper
reviews the main policy changes introduced in developing countries in the last 20 years.
Empirical evidence for developing countries is discussed thoroughly. At the end we
summarize the lessons learned from both the successful and the catastrophic reform
experiences of the developing countries.
2.1 Reforms and economic growth
In the last two decades, the increasingly dominant view is that price stability, fiscal
discipline, and policies which strengthen markets are preconditions of sustainable
growth. With the aim to improve economic growth, under the auspices of the
Washington Consensus Agenda, reform measures, including, among others,
stabilization programmes, trade and capital account liberalization, privatization, and
deregulation, were introduced in many developing countries around the world.
Among the economic reforms, trade liberalization is often considered to play a key role
because of its links to economic growth, poverty and income inequality. One common
argument associating trade to growth is the theory that protectionism constrains the
marginal efficiency of capital by limiting the reach of local firms and the size of their
markets, thus diminishing the incentives to invest and accumulate capital. Increasing
competition in domestic markets forces local firms to adopt new managerial practices
and new methods for organizing work to improve efficiency. This eventually increases
productivity at the aggregate level, and thus output growth. If the least efficient
domestic firms exit from the market as a result of tighter competition, one can expect an
average efficiency rise in the overall economy.
More recently, a vast segment of the literature on endogenous growth has advocated that
the removal of barriers to the flow of goods, capital, and ideas impacts positively on
economic development through total factor productivity (TFP) growth (Grossman and
Helpman 1991a, 1991b; Parente and Prescott 1994, 2000, among others). This is
assumed to occur through an increase in the country’s capacity to absorb and imitate the
technological advances generated by the leading economies. Indeed, trade liberalization
allows local firms to secure access to technological upgrading through cheaper capital
and other inputs, and efficiency gains through learning-by-exporting. Human capital
plays a key role in generating continuous growth by either preventing a decline in the
returns to capital or by increasing the capacity to innovate and adapt imported
technologies. Sarquis and Arbache (2003) show that technical changes resulting from
trade and capital liberalization enhance the external effects of human capital.3
Edwards (1998), and Dollar and Kraay (2004) employ cross-country analyses and note a
positive relationship among various trade policy indicators and TFP and GDP growth
rates, respectively. Case studies have presented evidence that trade openness in the
developing countries resulted in growth in TFP and GDP (Jonsson and Subramanian
1999; Lee 1996; McNab and Moore 1998). These results are not indisputable however.
Harrison (1996) also conducts cross-country regressions and finds only modest results
to link trade to GDP growth. Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) argue that both
methodological shortcomings and problematic indicators of openness characterize most
empirical studies on trade and growth, resulting in the inappropriate conclusion that
openness is associated to higher growth rates. Furthermore, the unambiguous causality
between trade and growth remains to be empirically shown. Nevertheless, the stylized
fact that no autarkic country has managed to sustain high growth performance over a
long period (Bhagwati and Srinivasan 2002) has strong implications, and the potential
role played by trade on growth deserves further attention.
Inflation and budget deficits have been found to have significant impacts on economic
performance. It is argued that inflation rates and/or fiscal deficits affect growth by
reducing the efficiency of investment and productivity growth (Fischer 1993; De
Gregorio 1996). Empirical evidence based on cross-country analyses has found a
negative relationship between inflation, budget deficits and GDP growth for both
developed and developing countries (De Gregorio and Lee 2003; Fischer 1993; De
Gregorio 1996). Bruno and Easterly (1995) present evidence that this relationship holds
only when high-inflation countries are in a cross-section dataset. They show that the
effects of low-to-moderate inflation rates on growth are unclear.
Based on public choice and Pareto optimality arguments, in the 1980s the view emerged
that the privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOE) and the deregulation of markets
would eventually deliver more and better utilities at cheaper prices, and thus ultimately
affect growth. The channels linking privatization and growth are characterized as
follows: first, privatization enhances productivity and the financial performance of
firms; second, it improves resource allocation; third, it boosts domestic investment;
fourth, it attracts FDI to developing economies; and lastly, it improves the government’s
fiscal situation. The literature has shown that the choice of appropriate methods of
privatization, considering the level of development of the country’s institutions and
financial and capital markets, as well as the type of post-privatization ownership, are
important for economic growth purposes (Bennett et al. 2004; Hansen 1997). Empirical
evidence for the developing countries is mixed. Plane (1997) and Barnett (2000) employ
cross-country analyses and find that privatization does contribute to growth, while Cook
and Uchida (2001), also with cross-country analyses, have contradictory findings.
Although there is no miraculous and infallible recipe on how to reach sustainable
economic growth in a developing country, the empirical literature on structural reforms
has shown that the sequencing, pace and timing of reforms are fundamental issues for
success. These factors are discussed below.
2.1.1 Sequencing of reforms
The sequencing of reforms can be critical for success because of potential conflicts that
may arise among various policies. One conflict relates to the role of the exchange rate
during stabilization and trade reforms. On the one hand, trade economists argue that
successful trade liberalization requires substantial exchange rate devaluation prior to4
reducing protection because of the (strong) anti-export bias normally prevailing in
import-substitution regimes (Krueger 1978, 1981; Bhagwati 1978). The exchange rate
depreciation shifts relative prices to favour exporters and may determine the
reallocation of resources necessitated by the trade reform. A devaluated exchange rate
also helps to contain trade deficits and eventual balance of payment problems. This can
be particularly critical for countries long protected from imports. Ceteris paribus,t h e
reduction of protection tends to generate an explosion of imports, ranging from
consumer goods to machines, while the expansion of exports is not as immediate.
Reallocation of resources and productivity increases take time, and firms—even those
that are intensive in local resources—may not immediately be prepared to compete
abroad. As a consequence, the exchange rate plays a decisive role in the transitory
period to a less protected regime.
On the other hand, if stabilization programmes rely heavily on the exchange rate as a
nominal anchor for reducing inflation, as was the case in several Latin American
countries suffering from chronically high inflation and severe fiscal imbalances, then
there is a trade-off between the exchange rate as a stabilization tool and its use as a trade
liberalization device to guide the resource reallocation process and the improvement of
efficiency. Thus, a fixed nominal exchange rate may be incompatible with the
competitive exchange rate needed for trade liberalization, and may eventually
jeopardize the reform. If capital account liberalization, privatization of SOEs, and
deregulation of markets are introduced simultaneously with trade openness, these attract
large foreign capital inflows, and the real exchange rate appreciates, thus reinforcing the
importance of the sequencing of reforms.
Exchange rate behaviour is not necessarily conflictive in the stabilization and economic
reforms adopted in low- or moderate-inflation countries, as stressed by Edwards (1992).
In these circumstances, trade and price stabilization may also be strengthened by the
price discipline of increased foreign competition, and the expansion in productivity
growth associated with market-oriented reforms.
The consensus in policy literature is that stabilization attempts should precede trade
liberalization, especially in countries in which the exchange rate is a key variable in
price formation and price indexation, and in countries with serious fiscal imbalances
(Edwards 1992, 1994a). Accordingly, Bhagwati and Srinivasan (2002) point out that
there are several cases, such as communist economies and India, where macroeconomic
stability has been achieved in the absence of trade openness, but no evidence of
successful outward orientation in the absence of macroeconomic stability, because
successful openness requires macroeconomic stability.
Although not quite considered a consensus, capital accounts liberalization may perhaps
strengthen openness when it contributes to financing investment projects in the tradable
sector and to improving overall economic efficiency. Portfolio investment, on the other
hand, may expose the process of structural reforms to potential pitfalls both in the
national and international economy through sudden reversals in the capital account.1
1 In view of the financial crashes of many developing countries that liberalized capital accounts, even
the IMF is now recommending a progressive capital liberalization approach (Williamson and Mahar
1998).5
A second potential conflict between stabilization and economic reforms is related to the
contribution of foreign trade taxes to public revenue. If the fiscal accounts are out of
control, trade tariff reductions may emphasize fiscal deficits, at least in the short run.
This argument may be especially valid for the small and underdeveloped economies that
rely heavily on import tax revenue.
A third potential conflict relates to uncertainty. It is argued that the effectiveness of
structural reforms is reduced in high inflation circumstances due to the uncertainty
associated with relative prices, thus affecting investments and the allocation of
resources. Stabilization, then, must come first.
The problems associated with the sequencing of reforms in developing countries have
been extensively investigated. Edwards (1992 1993a, 1993b, 1994a, 1994b, 1997)
carefully documents the attempts of the Latin American countries to stabilize and
introduce market-oriented reforms in the 1970s and 1980s. He finds that the countries of
the region did not address the main macroeconomic imbalances before the introduction
of drastic trade liberalization. In particular, the trade-off between using the exchange
rate for bringing inflation down and using it for maintaining a competitive real
exchange rate position became in many cases the critical issue that further contributed
to macroeconomic imbalances. This is exemplified by the case of Mexico, whose
overvalued currency ended up under a speculative attack in 1994-95. Calvo and Vegh
(1999) review and evaluate the literature on exchange rate-based stabilization plans in
developing countries. According to this study, countries ended up in
balance-of-payment crises because of fiscal problems, large current account deficits,
lack of monetary authority credibility, among other factors.
Finally, trade liberalization is assumed to increase the growth of imports and exports.
The net impact on the trade balance and the balance of payments will, however, depend
on the relative impact of openness on import and export growth, and on what happens to
the price of traded goods (Santos-Paulino and Thirlwall 2004). If the balance of
payments worsens, economic growth may be adversely affected on the demand side
because payment deficits are unsustainable, i.e., they may constrain growth to less than
the product-growth potential. If the goal is to avoid trade balance deficits, this issue
highlights the importance of import and export liberalization sequencing in developing
countries. In such circumstances, trade deficits are financed either by sustainable long-
term capital, or by short-term capital, which in turn, depends on interest rate
differentials. Ceteris paribus, the higher the balance-of-payments deficits, the higher the
domestic-foreign interest rate differential should be. This, of course, is unsustainable
and has severe short- and long-term impacts on economic growth and public finances.
The alternative to borrowing is currency devaluation, which is successful only if the
external crisis is not grave (Knan and Zahler 1985).
Santos-Paulino and Thirlwall (2004) empirically examine the impacts of trade openness
on the trade balances of developing countries. They find that trade liberalization has a
substantially higher impact on import growth than on export growth; that trade
liberalization worsens the trade balance and current accounts; and that the potential
impact of trade on economic growth is eroded by the adverse effects of the
balance-of-payment deficits on the economy. Parikh (2002) also finds evidence for a
broad set of countries that liberalization deteriorates the trade balance and current
accounts of developing countries. Pacheco-López and Thirlwall (2004) show that the
growth rate in Mexico has fallen as a result of the balance-of-payments problems caused6
by the rapid increase in the income elasticity of imports after openness. In a large set of
developing countries, De Gregorio and Lee (2003) find that balance-of-payment crises
have a strong and negative effect on GDP growth.
2.1.2 Pace and timing of reforms
Another issue that appears to be critical for successful economic reforms is the pace at
which reforms are introduced. It has been argued that gradual introduction of
liberalization reforms gives firms time to adapt and restructure to the new environment
constraints (Little, Scitovsky and Scott 1970; Michaely 1985). A rapid liberalization
process, for instance, tends to be accompanied in the short run by a significant increase
in import penetration, adding to unemployment and bankruptcies. Indeed, in highly
protected economies these effects are even stronger, and the prospects of a trade
imbalance are much higher. Santos-Paulino and Thirlwall (2004) find evidence that
trade imbalance, after trade openness, becomes substantially more severe in the more
closed economies than in ones with a low level of protection. A gradualist reform
pattern would reduce adjustment costs so that the economy can reallocate resources,
allowing firms to improve performance, and giving workers the time to re-train and find
jobs in the expanding sectors. Defining the adequate pace of reforms is, however, far
from being an obvious task for both economists and policymakers. This is due to the
static versus dynamic economic aspects that are always involved in the sequencing,
pace and timing of reforms.
The pace of policy reforms can be intrinsically related to political economy and the
institutional framework. As Rodrik (2000) documents, the most successful reforms were
those introduced gradually in stages, as in the East Asian countries. More recent
examples include China and India which, until now, had liberalized their markets only
partially and are still experimenting. Rodrik credits the success of these country cases to
the path of reform which took the country’s pre-existing institutions into account.2
Although reforms in Latin American and other countries were inspired at least in part by
the experience of the East Asian countries, they were introduced much more quickly
and, in some areas, more extensively than what was done in the example countries
(Rodrik 1996, 2000). Consequently, post-reform transition in the Latin American
countries has been more difficult than anticipated, and up to now most countries are yet
to experience any significant improvement in output growth rates (Solimano and Soto
2003; De Gregorio and Lee 2003).
Rodrik (1996), Krueger (1993), Edwards (1993b), among others, examine the factors
that drive the bulk and pace of reforms in developing countries. They argue that rapid
changes in policy orientations are ultimately a desperate attempt to deal with acute
economic crises. For instance, Lora (2000) investigates empirically the determinants of
reforms in Latin America and finds evidence that economic crisis is the main factor that
makes them viable. Thus, after several years of import-substitution strategies and strong
participation by the state in the economy, Latin American countries suddenly introduced
trade and capital account liberalization, privatization, and profound administrative
reforms. Rodrik (1996) argues that the acute macroeconomic crises, compounded with
2 A good example is perhaps the dual-track pricing system introduced in the agricultural sector in China
in the early stage of the reforms.7
the accelerating inflation and declining growth observed since the early 1980s,
eventually discredited the economic policies that had been developed over previous
decades and shaped the consensus of the society for the adoption of somewhat radical
policies.
An obvious question is why policies, which were perceived to worsen economic
conditions, were so long-lived in these countries. The answer offered by the literature is
related to distributional effects and political instability (Alesina and Drazen 1991; Özler
and Tabellini 1991; Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini 1992, inter alia). An
unsustainable fiscal or monetary policy, which is suboptimal from the macro view, can
be effective in redistributing, at the expense of society, income or rents to favoured
groups influent in government decisions. In this framework, such policies last until the
costs incurred by the favoured group offset the benefits, thus working to postpone
reforms. At very high levels of inflation, it may be optimal for the benefited groups to
agree on stabilization. It seems that the ‘war of attrition’, as termed by Alesina and
Drazen (1991), and its deleterious consequences on the economy are perhaps a common
feature of societies with lower degrees of social cohesion and bad distribution of
resources. Rodrik (1999) finds that high inequality in conjunction with weak conflict
management institutions (such as social safety nets, rule of law, and democratic
institutions) is particularly destructive, and prevents societies from responding
adequately to macroeconomic shocks. Edwards (1993b) finds evidence that developing
countries with weaker governments and unstable and polarized political environments
have greater difficulties in implementing successful economic reforms. An important
outcome of this literature is that the longer the delay of reforms the higher the burden to
be incurred by society, and the more skewed it will be.
The period in which the reforms are implemented by a country may also determine their
effectiveness. International economic and institutional environments vary considerably
over time and consequently can be more or less conducive to the success of reform.
Nowadays, a vigorous export-led strategy supported by active industrial and trade
policies, as those implemented by the East Asian countries in the past, would not be
feasible. Indeed, the Uruguay Round and the resulting agreements in intellectual
property rights, subsidies, and investments, along with the restricted access to
developed-country markets for agricultural and other basic goods, WTO trade regime,
regional trade agreements, and the new financial architecture substantially reduce the
degree of freedom governments currently have for establishing policies aimed at
development.
A complementary issue is related to the short timespan in which trade and capital
liberalization took place in developing countries over the last 15-20 years. If countries
with ‘similar’ levels of comparative advantages introduce ‘similar’ reforms at the same
time, then one could expect that the terms of trade in the short run would be potentially
affected, and competition for foreign direct investments and credit would increase. For
instance, if garment-producer countries open their economies in anticipation of boosting
exports to finance growth, then the increased supply of garments on the world market
would depress prices, thus diminishing the benefits of openness.3 The competition to
3 The case of coffee beans is perhaps illustrative. In recent years there has been a substantial increase in
world production, and much of it came from countries such as Vietnam, significantly depressing the
price and thus the income of coffee farmers and rural labourers.8
attract FDI and market shares becomes even harder with the entrance of Eastern
European countries in European Union in 2004.
Hence, the ‘late-comer countries’, i.e., those which have recently introduced trade
liberalization and other market reforms, are facing with not only significantly more
institutional and economic constraints and narrower space in which to introduce
development strategies, but also added competition from other late-comer countries on
the export market. Furthermore, tougher competition in attracting foreign investments
has reduced the rewards of trade and capital liberalization (Arbache 2001a). Parikh
(2002) finds empirical evidence that the terms of trade in conjunction with trade
liberalization have been detrimental to the developing countries’ trade balances and
current accounts. These factors have to be taken into account in a comparison of the
reform experiences of the East Asian and late-comer countries, given the existence of
the significantly different environments and policy autonomy.
2.2 Reforms and income inequality
The most popular theorems according to which trade openness reduces inequality is
provided by the Heckscher-Ohlin, and Stolper and Samuelson (HOS). In short, according
to the HOS model, a country has a comparative advantage in the production of goods
which are intensive in the production factor that is relatively more abundant. Such a factor
is relatively cheaper compared to the price of other factors, which are relatively scarce. If
trade liberalization increases the demand for products with comparative advantage and
reduces the demand for factor-scarce goods, there will be a rise in the demand of the
abundant factor and thus in its relative price. Thus, developing countries that introduce
trade liberalization programmes should experience an improvement in income inequality
indicators, since they are abundant in unskilled labour.
Country studies, together with cross-country analyses for the developing countries that
introduced trade openness, have not supported the HOS proposition on inequality
(Hanson and Harrison 1999; Beyer, Rojas and Vergara 1999; Dollar and Kraay 2004;
inter alia). Furthermore, a relative wage rise for skilled workers is observed (Cragg and
Epelbaum 1996; Feenstra and Hanson 1997; Sanchez-Paramo and Schady 2002; Robbins
and Gindling 1999; Feliciano 2001, inter alia).
Complementary explanations have been put forth to interpret these empirical findings. As
was seen above, one consequence of trade liberalization is a rapid inflow of foreign
technology resulting from increased imports of machines and intermediate inputs, and
FDI. Generally the inflowing technology is skill-biased because it has been designed
mainly in the industrialized, skill-intensive world. A fortiori, because the new technology
is skill-biased within the industrialized world (Berman, Bound and Machin 1998), it
therefore induces a change in the labour demand in favour of skilled workers. This shift, if
sufficiently large, can outweigh the reduction in the demand for skilled labour that is
predicted by the HOS model. The magnitude of the technological shift on the wage
structure varies according to the elasticities of supply of skilled and unskilled labour, and
the elasticity of substitution.
Wood (1999) argues that the entry of countries with a high content of unskilled labour
like China, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Indonesia into global goods market in the
mid-1980s had an important impact on the income inequality of middle-income countries,9
particularly in Latin America. He argues that the increased supply of unskilled labour-
intensive goods changed the supply structure of goods in the world market, reduced their
prices and the return-to-factors involved in the production of such goods. This hurt the
countries that produced goods with some degree of comparative advantage. Consequently,
these countries were under pressure to change their production techniques to search for a
comparative advantage in the production of goods using semi-skilled labour. The result
was a rise in the demand for this type of worker, and boosted wage dispersion in these
countries.
The rationalization of production resulting from both FDI and tougher competition in the
domestic markets, and from the exit of the least efficient firms, also affect labour demand
to favour skilled workers. Indeed, if inefficient or low-productivity firms are unskilled-
labour intensive, their demise or exit from the market would induce an increase in the
relative demand for skilled workers. Recent empirical evidence on the part of Latin
American countries supports these hypotheses (Fernandes 2003; Pavcnik 2002).4
Wood (1994, 1999) reports rising demand for unskilled labour and declining wage
inequality in South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore after the 1960s introduction of an
export-led strategy. These cases are consistent with the implication of the HOS model that
integration of the developing countries to the international economy is accompanied by
greater employment and a reduction in income inequality. Thus, it seems that sequencing,
pace and timing of reforms matter for income inequality.
One standard link between inflation and inequality is through unemployment. The
assumption is that inflation, in the short run, adversely impacts on economic performance,
affecting job and income creation, and subsequently inequality. In countries severely
affected by chronic inflation, such as the Latin American countries in the recent past,
inflation can promote inequality through other complementary channels. The poor and
lower-middle income classes have limited access to the financial mechanisms that could
protect them from the adverse effects of inflation. For instance, since they do not have
access to interest-bearing chequing accounts, or goods purchased on credit, their
consumption is affected. Empirical evidence based on country studies and cross-country
analyses support the hypothesis that inflation worsens inequality (Gonzales-Rozada and
Menendez 2002; Urani 1996; Ferreira and Litchfield 1999; Li and Zou 2002).5
According to evidence in the literature, the poor are severely affected in the aftermath of
stabilization plans by the restrictive monetary and fiscal policies that normally accompany
anti-inflationary plans. Consequently, it has become widely recognized nowadays that
compensatory policies and social protection are fundamental components of structural
reforms.
Deregulation of the labour market is seen to play a key role in income inequality
reduction and poverty alleviation. According to the basic approach, if the labour market is
4 Several models have offered alternative explanations for the rising inequality in developing countries
after trade liberalization; among them are Feenstra and Hanson (1995) and Davis (1996). For further
details on this literature, see Arbache (2002).
5 Galli and van der Hoeven (2001) show that the impact of orthodox policies on inequality depends on
the initial level of inflation. If inflation is initially relatively low, orthodox policies may cause
increasing inequality.10
competitive it is able to smooth out the adverse short-run effects of increasing imports,
restrictive fiscal and monetary policies, privatization, and other policy changes on
labour demand. The idea is simply that a deregulated labour market minimizes the
adverse effects of reform on the level of employment. However, if the labour market is
severely regulated, its responses to shocks and policy changes are limited, which
generates higher and persistent unemployment and makes jobs more precarious in the
informal sector. This view, however, is not widely accepted. It is argued that labour
markets in developing countries are already flexible because of employers’ non-
compliance with labour laws, and that the informal sector is mainly characterized by
poor growth rates and limited technology of the micro-entrepreneurs.
Advocates for labour market deregulation argue that the flexible labour markets of the
East Asian countries contributed to the success of employment generation during
reforms (Krueger 1990). Forteza and Rama (2001) conduct cross-country analyses for
more than 100 countries and find evidence to suggest that countries with more labour
market rigidities experience deeper recessions before adjustment and slower recovery
afterwards. On the other hand, Gruber (1997) finds that a reduction in the payroll tax in
Chile increased not employment but wages, as the previous employment and wage
levels were already adjusted for labour costs.
2.3 Reforms and poverty
Contrary to the link observed between trade and inequality, there is no well-established
theoretical association between trade and poverty. This matter has been treated by the
literature as an empirical issue. The basic static view implies that trade openness may
contribute to an enlargement of the cake, and consequently to an increase in the cake
slice of the poor.6 An obvious problem is that the poor do not necessarily get a bigger
slice of a larger cake. Ceteris paribus, the poor would benefit if the spurt of economic
growth caused by trade openness has a neutral or biased effect in favour of unskilled
labour, i.e., if the HOS model worked. In the short run, the magnitude of the trade effect
on unskilled labour wages would vary according to the supply elasticities of skilled and
unskilled labour. Another possible transmission channel is the impact trade
liberalization has on poor household consumer prices.
If trade openness favours the integration of poor workers, such as small farmers and
rural labourers, into the mainstream economy, then it may have a poverty-reducing
effect.7 But the opposite may occur if the increasing international integration
encourages the establishment of large plantations of exportable crops. Small farmers are
left aside and may be harmed by the subsequent concentration of land.8
6 Thus, the causality goes like this: trade → TFP growth → output growth → poverty reduction.
Ultimately, this is the trickle-down argument.
7 One example is the increasing participation of the Vietnamese coffee farmers in the world coffee
market after the introduction of an export-led strategy.
8 There are other complementary liberalization aspects linked to poverty such as agriculture protection,
TRIPs, labour standards, environmental standards, TRIMs, among others. These are beyond the scope
of this brief survey. For a detailed discussion, refer to McCulloch, Winters and Cirera (2001).11
The empirical evidence on trade and poverty is mixed, and the results are conditional on
the size of the country, trade policies, among other factors. Dollar and Kraay (2004) use
cross-country analyses and find that absolute poverty has declined more in open
economies than in autarkic ones. Hertel et al. (2001) simulate the impact of multilateral
trade liberalization on certain developing countries and find a variety of responses to
openness among poor households and among countries. Quibria’s study (2002) shows
that the economic growth following the introduction of export-led strategies in the East
Asian countries promoted rapid poverty reduction mainly through job creation.
Privatization of utilities and infrastructure may have an impact on poverty through
various channels, but the main channel is through economic growth. An appropriate
regulatory framework and privatization of SOEs are recognized as being conducive to
private sector investments, which ultimately affect output growth. Privatization is
assumed to boost growth through efficiency improvement, reduction of infrastructure
bottlenecks, and expansion of coverage. If privatization programmes promote
competition in the utility markets, then consumers benefit from better quality and
greater provision of services, and perhaps also lower prices. The poor may benefit more
because they spend proportionally a higher share of their budgets on utilities, and
because their access to services and infrastructure is generally much more restricted
than the non-poor.
Two important—and almost forgotten—potential side effects of privatization for the
poor are (i) the improved provision of and better access to energy, potable water and
sewage, factors which substantially improve health and well-being; and (ii) more and
better infrastructure in poorer areas and better access to such utilities raise the property
values of the poor, thus causing a wealth effect. These potential effects may have an
impact on the labour supply, investment in education, and access to the credit market,
for example.
The hypothesis of privatization benefiting the poor does not hold if the areas covered
and/or post-privatization prices do not match the needs and affordability of the poor. In
other words, privatization of utilities and infrastructure has to be supported with
regulatory means to make the coverage and access to poor areas compulsory, and
supported with some kind of subsidy in accordance with the purchase capacity of the
poor for these services.
Estache, Foster and Wodon (2002) survey the literature and conduct an extensive
investigation of the impacts of privatization on poverty in Latin America. They
conclude that the access to services and their affordability are still a major problem, and
that privatization does not necessarily reduce poverty. They argue that infrastructure
investment is central in alleviating poverty in the region.
Empirical evidence on the relationship between privatization and income inequality is
very scarce. Chisari, Estache and Romero (1999) find that operational gains from
private sector participation in utilities, and effective regulation in Argentina improved
the GDP and reduced income inequality. This can occur if effective regulations act as a
mechanism for transferring rents from companies to consumers, and if the poor are
targeted for the benefits.12
2.4 Conclusions
In view of the theoretical and empirical literature presented above, it seems that
structural reforms favour economic growth and reduce inequality and poverty.
However, structural reforms seem to be a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for
achieving these goals. Based on the literature, the best we can say is that reforms may
succeed if certain conditions are met. The literature we reviewed points to some critical
issues that developing countries embracing structural reforms need to recognize:
— Coordination among micro and macro reforms. This issue is especially
important for countries with a long tradition of inflation, fiscal and
balance-of-payments imbalances, and is fundamental for avoiding conflicts
among reforms.
— Favourable political environment. Weak governments and a low degree of
social cohesion disrupt reforms and/or prevent their implementation.
— Fiscal discipline. Severe fiscal deficits jeopardize structural reforms.
— Balance-of-payments under control. Severe balance-of-payments imbalances
also jeopardize reforms, especially in countries with chronic
balance-of-payments problems. Exchange rate plays a key role during reforms.
— Pace of reforms adequate to country’s specificities. Pace and timing of reforms
have to take into account the country’s economic, social, and institutional
weaknesses and constraints, and the international economic environment.
In summary, achieving sustainable growth is possibly a harder task today than in the
recent past because of institutional constraints, protectionism from developed countries,
competition among late-comer countries, and the limited room for governments to
conduct development policies. Thus, the success stories of growth will be those in
which policymakers go beyond the standard recipe.
3 The structural reforms in Brazil
The political, economic and social contexts in which structural reform programmes are
introduced help to explain their content, attainment, and limitations. Moreover, the
context sets the conditions of failure or success of the reforms. Before going into detail
on policy changes, we review the domestic environment in Brazil prior to reforms.
3.1 The context of reforms
3.1.1 Politics
Following a coup d’etat against the leftist President João Goulart, the military held
power in Brazil from 1964 until 1985. The military enjoyed a degree of civil alliance
while the economy boomed in the 1970s. But the decline in economic indicators after
the oil crisis, and the painful austerity programme imposed on Brazil by IMF in the
early 1980s fuelled protests and strikes. These culminated in mass demonstrations to
support direct elections, thus precipitating the end of the military era.13
In early 1985, an electoral college elected Tancredo Neves as the first civil president in
twenty-one years. But he collapsed the night before his inauguration, and the presidency
was passed to Vice-President José Sarney, a conservative politician and long-time
supporter of the military regime. By October 1988, Sarney had become very unpopular
because of a sharp acceleration in inflation (in spite of three consecutive stabilization
plans) and allegations of corruption. Impeachment proceedings were initiated on
charges of corruption, but the measure was blocked through political bargains. During
Sarney’s presidency, Brazil experienced very rapid macroeconomic deterioration and a
worsening of the social indicators.
The first democratic elections in the post-military period in late 1989 had two front-
runner candidates; Lula da Silva, a labour union leader, and Collor de Mello, son of an
old-style conservative family, ex-ally of the military. The winner, Collor de Mello,
triggered extremely high expectations that he could rid Brazil of inflation and rampant
corruption. Collor’s ambitious programme involved curbing the size of the state,
privatization, deregulation of markets, and trade liberalization. He began his term of
office by defaulting on the internal public debt and confiscating some US$50 billion in
financial and bank assets from depositors and investors, plunging the country into a
strong recession. These policies stirred the anger of important sectors of the society,
from civil servants to the business leaders who had been hurt by trade competition and
deregulatory measures. Although he commanded a small minority bloc in Congress,
Collor’s high ratings in the polls and excellent television communication skills
dissuaded many politicians from opposing his unusual proposals in the election year. As
inflation increased in 1991 after two short-lived stabilization plans, the government
began to flounder, and the opposition was able to thwart many of the government’s
proposals. Serious accusations of corruption led the Congress to start impeachment
proceedings against him in 1992. Later investigations revealed that the corruptive
system had numerous collaborators in the Congress and in the executive branch.
Vice-President Itamar Franco took over the government, installed a politically balanced
cabinet and sought broad support from Congress. Contrary to Collor, Franco was a man
of more simple habits and tastes, but quite temperamental. The economy recovered
during his administration, although the inflation rose in step with growth. In 1993,
Senator Fernando Henrique Cardoso was appointed minister of finance, and conducted a
successful stabilization attempt, the Plano Real.Am o n t ha f t e rt h ep l a nw e n ti n t oe f f e c t
Cardoso resigned as minister to run for presidential elections. The success of the Plano
Real helped Cardoso gain an outright victory against Lula da Silva in the first round of
the election. He had massive support from most of the Congress political blocs, and
from the majority of the newly elected governors. Cardoso came to power in a unique
political environment to lead the country successfully to prosperity. The election of
Cardoso is viewed by many as the re-inauguration of the re-democratization period after
the frustrations of the Sarney and Collor presidencies.
3.1.2 Economy
From the end of the Second World War till the mid-1980s Brazil followed an import-
substitution industrialization (ISI) strategy. After the war, balance-of-payment crisis and
rising inflation led the government to adopt foreign exchange controls and import
licensing, giving priority to the import of essential goods, fuels and machinery, thus
strongly protecting the consumer goods industry. Early in the 1950s, the government
adopted an explicit ISI policy, as it was understood to be the only way to modernize the14
economy and to promote rapid growth. Several instruments were put in place, such as
foreign exchange controls and a multiple exchange rate system, designed at selecting
imports considered to be essential. Similarly, some exports were promoted with higher
exchange rates than those of traditional exports, but the performance of the export sector
improved only modestly. Complementary measures were introduced, including
subsidies, a new tariff system, and strong inducements to foreign direct investment.
Programmes intended to better steer the industrialization process, to remove
bottlenecks, and to promote vertical integration were created for industries considered
essential for growth, notably the automotive, cement, steel, aluminium, cellulose, heavy
machinery, and chemical industries. The protective system evolved in such a way that
by the end of the 1980s more than half of all industrial products were in the ‘Anexo C’,
the list of items not to be imported.
As a result of the ISI, the Brazilian economy experienced rapid growth and considerable
diversification, and the average annual rate of growth exceeded 7 per cent in the 1950s.
The structure of the manufacturing sector changed substantially as a result of the
policies in place. Traditional industries such as textiles, food products, and clothing
declined, while transport equipment, machinery, electric equipment and appliances, and
chemical industries expanded. The rapid growth resulted in a substantial increase in
imports, while the foreign exchange policies proved inadequate for export growth,
which led to increasing trade deficits. A feature of the ISI era was the establishment of
SOEs in infrastructure and in tradable industries. At the end of the 1980s, public
companies were largely dominant in several sectors.
The modernizing economic reforms of 1964-67, such as the establishment of a central
bank, financial reform, and anti-inflationary policies, together with the favourable state
of the world economy, created good conditions for very rapid growth between 1968 and
1973, when the average annual rate of growth of GDP reached 11 per cent. The external
sector contributed to the high growth rates, as did the rapid expansion of capital
accumulation, including a growing share of public investment and investment by SOEs.
Thirlwall and Hussain (1982) show that half of Brazil’s growth rate in the 1950s and
1960s was financed by capital inflows. The industrial sector generally experienced not
only fast growth but also considerable modernization. As a result, imports of capital
goods and basic and semi-processed inputs increased rapidly.
Brazil suffered drastic reductions in its terms of trade as a result of the 1973 oil shock.
With the trade balance under pressure, the oil shock led to a higher import bill. Under
these circumstances, one prudent course of action would have been to devalue the
currency and to adopt growth-reducing policies in order to contain imports. However,
Brazil opted to continue a high-growth policy, and adopted renewed ISI and economic
diversification strategies. This strategy was effective in promoting growth, but it also
sharply augmented Brazil’s import requirements, increasing the already large current
account deficit, which was financed by running up foreign debt. Despite the world
recession resulting from other countries’ adjustments to the oil shock, Brazil was able to
maintain a high growth rate, and between 1974 and 1980 the average annual rate of
growth of real GDP reached 7 per cent. However, the current-account deficit increased
from US$2 billion in 1973 to US$13 billion in 1980, and foreign debt rose from US$6.4
billion in 1963 to nearly US$54 billion in 1980.
The effects of the industrialization of 1974-85 on the balance of trade were significant,
as it moved from an average deficit of US$3.4 billion in the 1974-76 to an average15
surplus of US$11 billion in 1983-85. Brazil was able to raise its foreign debt because
the international financial system was awash in petrodollars and was eagerly offering
low-interest loans. By the end of the 1970s, however, the foreign debt had reached high
levels. Additionally, the marked increase in international interest rates after the
Mexican’s moratorium in 1982 raised the debt service, forcing the country to borrow
more just to meet interest payments.
One key feature of the 1974-80 period was the sharp acceleration of inflation, which
rose from 15.5 per cent in 1973 to 110 per cent by 1980. Over the 1980s, inflation
accelerated even more rapidly reaching hyperinflation levels by the end of the decade
(see Figure 1). The high and persistent inflation observed for years in Brazil has a fiscal
origin, and its explanation goes beyond the single inflation tax story.9 Bacha (1994)
shows that harsh disputes among economic and political groups regarding public
spending and subsidies produced public budgets in which total public expenditures were
substantially higher than total public revenues, thus causing inflationary pressure. In
order to accommodate inconsistent budgets, fiscal authorities used to delay the actual
spending, in anticipation that inflation would reduce its real amount. This ‘way out’ for
managing public budgets was feasible only when there was little or imperfect indexation
of inflation, and no external shocks.
The debt crisis that followed the Mexican default exposed the inconsistencies in the
fiscal regime. The sudden halt in international financing of the balance-of-payment
deficits called for strong measures for fiscal adjustment which, in fact, never occurred.
As a consequence, the fiscal and balance-of-payment deficits fuelled inflation, and
caused widespread demand for public spending, wage and price indexation, thus
accelerating inflation very rapidly in the first half of the 1980s. The re-democratization
process in 1985 was followed by expansionist fiscal policies that brought more
inflationary pressures.
The main outcome of the acceleration of inflation was a strong and increasing economic
instability, causing adverse impacts on economic growth, a dramatic drop in
investments, and rising income inequality. Several desperate heterodox attempts based
on price and wage freezes to stop inflation were undertaken between 1986 and 1991, but
all failed mainly due to the lack of fiscal adjustment.10 All stabilization attempts led to
an immediate drop in inflation, with subsequent rapid acceleration, after economic
agents increasingly become the wiser from previous plans, and learned to develop
self-protection mechanisms against inflation and new price freezes. This process of
anticipation and learning led to increasing rates of inflation that eventually developed
into hyperinflation. Thus, the pre-Plano Real annualized inflation rate of June 1994
reached 5,300 per cent.
After decades of rapid economic growth, there was an abrupt economic slowdown in
1980-92, and the average output growth rate fell to 2 per cent. Bugarin et al. (2002)
show that the detrended per working age output dropped 26.5 per cent below the 1992
trend, as compared with 1980, characteristic of a depression (see Figure 2). A sharp
9 The monetarist view of inflation acceleration considers inflation tax as a mechanism of public deficit
financing along with the Cagan’s (1956) model (Silva and Andrade 1996).
10 In total, five stabilization plans were introduced during the Sarney and Collor administration periods:
the Cruzado (1986), Bresser (1987), Verão (1989), Collor I (1990) and Collor II (1991).16
drop in output followed the Mexican crisis and, after some recovery, a much stronger
drop followed during the period of heterodox stabilization plans. Bugarin et al. show
that the main cause of this output drop was the relative price of investment goods. They
argue that the increasing macroeconomic instability caused by the price and wage
freezes and fiscal deterioration encouraged economic agents to seek protection for their
savings. This fuelled the demand for real estate. As a consequence, the price level of the
construction sector, which accounts for the larger share of total investments in Brazil,
grew much faster than the price level of the economy, and gross investment, as a share
of GDP, fell from 23.6 per cent in 1980 to 14 per cent in 1992.
Pinheiro (2003) presents a similar story. He conducts a growth accounting
decomposition and shows that capital accumulation drops from 4.5 per cent in 1964-80
to 1.3 per cent in 1981-93, accounting for half of the average output growth fall of 6.2
per cent in the period. TFP also fell significantly, from 1.7 per cent to -0.7 per cent.
Capital accumulation, together with TFP, explains 90 per cent of the output growth
collapse. The 1980s became known as the ‘lost decade’, and its severe economic
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3.1.3 Social conditions
Despite its relatively high average per capita income, Brazil has a highly skewed
income distribution, among the world’s worst. Socioeconomic inequality involves
subtle forms of residential, educational, and workplace discrimination that tend to
segregate members of distinct socioeconomic strata so that they live, work, and circulate
in different settings. The poor has limited—and at times no—access to government
services such as health, education, and sanitation, and limited participation in the formal
labour market. Consequently, they are generally not covered by labour legislation nor
by most social protection schemes. Poverty is widespread in urban and rural areas,
reaching the highest levels in rural parts of the northeast region.
Various forms of deprivation, growth of favelas, urban violence, street children, and
epidemics of diseases such as dengue, have been common not only in large, but also in
medium-sized and small cities all over the country. The pervasiveness of high levels of
poverty and inequality along with the high concentration of land and property, and the
deepening of the economic crisis, started to create tensions in rural and urban areas in
the late 1980s. Pillaging and seizures of unused private land and urban properties
fuelled conflicts in various parts of the country, especially in the poorest regions, as the
numbers of landless workers increased. The rising social problems and the limited
effectiveness of governmental policies to tackle the huge social problems raised
concerns and uncertainties, and called for urgent policies to promote growth and create
jobs. For the 1990s, this was perhaps the main legacy of the previous decades.
3.2 The major reforms
3.2.1 Trade liberalization
Prior to 1990, the Brazilian economy was highly protected and regulated by virtue of
the vigorous ISI strategy that was followed by successive administrations. As a result,
Brazil was a closed economy by the end of the 1980s. Some modest tariff reduction and
the lifting of redundant barriers commenced in 1988. However, the major break with the
ISI era began in 1990 under the Collor administration, when efforts to contain inflation
were combined with drastic trade liberalization. The government introduced a four-year
schedule to reduce the level of protection, but in practice it was completed in only three
years. By the middle of 1993, most of the complex and bureaucratic non-tariff barriers
had been removed, and a new tariff structure was imposed, which substantially reduced
the degree of protectionism. In 1987, the weighted average nominal tariff was 55 per
cent; by 1992 it had been reduced to 14 per cent. This was accompanied by a sharp fall
in the range of tariffs and a decreasing standard deviation to about one-third of the
previous figure. The weighted average effective tariff, which remained largely
unchanged in the 1980s, dropped from 68 per cent in 1987 to 18 per cent in 1992, while
the standard deviation declined from 54 per cent to 17 per cent (Kume, Piani and Souza
2003). On the export side, subsidies were eliminated and tax incentives were drastically
reduced in 1990. Although the new tariffs were still relatively high by international
standards, the removal of non-tariff barriers shifted the pattern of protection, especially
in the manufacturing sector, and signalled that the long period of protectionism was at
an end.
Coupled with the appreciation of the exchange rate (see Figure 3), trade liberalization
led to a significant importation of consumer goods, enhancing the competition in18
domestic markets and consequently pushing the local firms to improve competitiveness.
Accordingly, there was a sharp increase in imports of capital goods and machinery. The
trade flow rose steadily, with imports increasing by 257 per cent and exports by 151 per
cent between 1990 and 1996. By 1996, the import penetration ratio had reached 10.7 per
cent, more than twice the 1990 figure, and the quantum of imports had increased almost
three times over the same period. Most of the effects of trade liberalization on the trade
balance were, however, postponed until 1994 and later due to the 1990-92 economic
stagnation and devaluation of exchange rate in 1991-92. In 1994, the combination of
further pragmatic liberalizing measures seeking to discipline domestic prices in the
aftermath of the Plano Real and increasing appreciation of the exchange rate affected
the trade accounts in such a way that the trade balance, after a long period of surplus,
started to face growing deficits (see Figure 4).
Figure 3




















































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5 shows that after the turn of the 1980s the import plus export to GDP ratio
based on current prices rose in the 1990s, although it remained quite low by
international standards. By 2002 trade policy was still playing an active role in the
allocation of resources, as suggested by the large variation in effective tariffs at the two-
digit industry level, ranging from -34 to 60.5 per cent (Moreira 2004).
3.2.2 Privatization
The privatization of SOEs in Brazil began modestly in 1981, and was confined mainly
to the re-privatization of companies that had been incorporated by the government
because of debts. Twenty companies were sold in the early 1980s, totalling US$190
million in revenue. During the Sarney administration, 18 SOEs owned by the National
Economic Development Bank (BNDES) were privatized, totalling US$539 million in
proceeds. Most of these were small- to medium-sized companies in sectors already
dominated by the private sector. According to Velasco (1999), privatization during this
period was possible, not only because of government determination, but also because of
the efforts made by BNDES, whose main motivation was to rid itself of loss-making
companies. Velasco argues that President Sarney endorsed the sales only because the
companies being privatized were not politically sensitive. Political support for a broader
privatization programme was low, and in 1989 the Congress rejected a law that would
have made SOEs, except those protected by constitutional impediment, subject to
privatization.
Policy changed significantly during the Collor administration. Facing imminent
hyperinflation and a virtually bankrupt public sector, plans for privatizing the public
enterprises were launched in conjunction with a stabilization attempt. It was in this
context that privatization became one of the major planks of the economic reforms of
the 1990s. Although much of the rhetoric used by advocates of privatization at the time
emphasized economic efficiency and competitiveness, privatization is better understood
as a desperate response to the deterioration of public finance and the rapid worsening of20
macroeconomic indicators. Its ultimate aim was to generate fiscal revenues to reduce
the public debt substantially and to consolidate price stability. The economic crisis and
the poor economic performance of the SOEs were fundamental factors in rallying the
support of the general public for the privatization plan.
It is not a surprise that many SOEs were in critical financial situation when the
following is taken into account.11 First, SOEs were frequently used as a political
bargaining tool, in which political appointees with poor administrative skills held
management positions. Second, they were used as a means to contract foreign loans
beyond their needs in order to meet the current account deficits, thus seriously harming
their performance. Third, SOEs were heavily utilized for anti-inflationary purposes, and
the prices of their goods and services often lagged behind inflation, benefiting
consumers at the expense of public finance.12
The national privatization programme (PND), created by the BNDES in 1990, expanded
the scope of privatization to include a number of enterprises formerly considered as
strategic by earlier governments. During the Collor government, there were no further
advances in the privatization programme due to the failure of stabilization plans and the
impeachment proceedings. In 1990-92, fifteen SOEs were privatized, yielding about
US$3.5 billion in total proceeds.
During President Franco’s administration, privatization continued despite his
sympathetic nationalist views. Among the most important enterprises sold in 1993-94
was Embraer, the Brazilian Aeronautics Company. Other sold enterprises included
chemical, fertilizer, and mining companies, and the steel sector was totally privatized by
the end of 1994. Altogether, 25 SOEs were sold in 1990-94, yielding US$12 billion in
proceeds and debt transfers.
Privatization gained momentum under the first administration of President Cardoso,
who shifted the focus to the SOEs responsible for a major part of Brazil’s economic
infrastructure, among these, enterprises in the energy, transportation, and
communication sectors. The constitutional amendments necessary for privatizing the
public monopolies and infrastructure, which in the past had been considered strategic
for the country, were possible mainly because of the initial success of the Plano Real.
This gave the government sufficient power and public support to push for the changes.
The incoming government regarded the privatization programme as a key measure for
raising revenues and achieving the fiscal discipline needed to sustain the Plano Real.
Privatization was also considered fundamental for making the investments in utilities
and infrastructure vital for sustainable growth. In a departure from earlier policy, the
giant mining company CVRD, one of Brazil’s largest enterprises, was privatized under
intense resistance, demonstrations, and legal battles between the government and
opposition party lawyers.
Between 1995 and 1998, the sale of companies in various sectors such as banking,
transportation, mining, power generation and distribution, and telecommunication
generated US$78.5 billion in total proceeds and US$15 billion in debt transfers. The
11 The three points that follow are from Pinheiro (2000).
12 This is seen as a key reason for explaining the opposition of national business leaders to the
privatization programme (Velasco 1999).21
privatization process was decelerated in the second term of President Cardoso, partly
due to a loss in political support. The state still remains the owner of companies and
assets in several sectors, most notably in the electricity, water and sanitation, and
banking sectors.
Between 1990 and 2002, more than 130 state and federal companies were sold,
rendering US$105.5 billion in total revenues, which, according to the BNDES, makes it
one of the largest privatization programmes in the world. These amounts played a
substantial role in preventing a worsening of the current account deficit and public debt.
According to Pinheiro, Giambiagi and Moreira (2001), the ratio in 1997-2000 between
FDI inflows associated with privatization and current account deficit averaged 25 per
cent. Carvalho (2001) shows that at the end of 1999 the public debt was 8.4 per cent of
GDP lower than it would have been in the absence of privatization. Conversely, Macedo
(2000) argues that privatization had a ‘macroeconomic cost’ as the enormous proceeds
from both national and foreign investors made the government less inclined to pursue
fiscal and current accounts adjustments in the 1995-98 period, thus postponing the
needed measures, and inflating the costs of the adjustment later. Despite the huge
amounts involved, the privatization programme did not contribute to reducing the public
debt; on the contrary, the increase in the debt surpassed the revenue obtained from
privatizing the SOEs.
One important consequence of privatization was the managerial changes observed in the
former state companies. In many cases, they became technologically updated, more
customer-oriented, raising productivity and output, increasing profits, and in turn,
having more access to credit for financing new investments. In infrastructure, however,
the sector suffering from a serious lack of investments for years because of the long
fiscal crisis, the benefits of privatization have not emerged yet. The reform of the
regulatory legal framework and the establishment of regulatory agencies are still not
complete, contributing to postponed investments.
3.2.3 Deregulation of markets
Major moves towards the deregulation of markets were introduced in 1990. Restrictive
rules and laws that had prevented contest in many sectors for a considerable period of
time began to be removed, and price controls and restrictions to entry were eliminated
in a number of sectors to stimulate competition, especially in manufacturing and service
sectors. Over the following years, the anti-trust legislation was strengthened and
modernized, and a consumer protection law was passed, which made firms liable for the
quality of their products and advertising. A new legislation on the protection of
intellectual property rights was passed in line with the Trade Related Intellectual
Property Rights Agreement of the World Trade Organization.
Constitutional amendments were approved eliminating discrimination against foreign
capital in various businesses, and discontinuing public monopolies in oil exploration,
gas, electricity, telecommunications, infrastructure, among other sectors. This allowed
the participation not only of domestic companies, but also foreign companies in the
market. Foreign investors were also granted the right to participate in privatization, and
by 2002, their share in the total privatization proceeds reached 48 per cent, amounting to
about US$50 billion. This was a substantial change in view of the long-established
position among influent politicians and business leaders who maintained that the greater22
participation of foreign capital could end up denationalizing the economy, which was
perceived to be against the national interests.
The privatization of major utility sectors and the foundation of Mercosur in 1991—the
trade agreement comprising Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay—played a
substantial role in attracting FDI to Brazil, as many multinational companies made Brazil
the regional export base for the Mercosur countries (Pinheiro and Moreira 2000). From
1990 to 1995, the inflow of FDI was, on average, US$3.2 billion per year. From 1996 to
1999, it jumped to an average of US$21.3 billion per year (see Figure 6). As a result, by
the end of the 1990s Brazil had become one of the top major FDI destination countries.
With regard to the labour market, some changes were introduced in the 1990s which
aimed at reducing the strong degree of interventionism of the labour legislation, and at
increasing the flexibility of labour relations. In 1994, a law called ‘Cooperative Law’ was
passed allowing firms to hire workers through cooperatives. The cooperatives in turn were
not obliged to comply with certain labour costs, which in practice meant that employers
were allowed to bypass some provisions of the Labour Code. Since then, outsourcing
through cooperatives has grown sharply as a method for reducing labour costs. In 1998
another law was passed, which for the first time allowed part-time labour contracts to be
issued. This law also introduced the establishment of a compensation scheme for
overtime.
Figure 6









































































































Source: Central Bank of Brazil.
3.2.4 Stabilization
In 1994, the Plano Real was introduced, and its novelty was the virtual currency, the
URV.13 The URV was pegged to the US dollar on a one-to-one basis, and there were
daily quotations of the URV in the prevailing currency, which rose according to inflation.
Taxes, social security, minimum wages, exchange rates, and public utility prices were all
converted to the URV. Economic agents were encouraged to set their prices and contracts
13 For a thorough theoretical discussion on the fundamentals of the Plano Real, see Silva and Andrade
(1996).23
voluntarily in the new unit within a period of four months. The aim was to align relative
prices and wages in order to break with indexation and free the economy from the inertial
effect on price formation without having to freeze prices, as before. At the end of the
fourth month, the URV was converted on the 1st of July 1994 to the new currency, the
real, set to equal one US dollar. The entire monetary base in the old currency was
physically replaced by the new currency in just a few days. The Plano Real was
successful in bringing inflation down, and inflation dropped from 50 per cent in June to
about 2-3 per cent in the following months, and to one-digit figures thereafter (see
Figure 7).
The diagnosis of inflation made by the economists of Plano Real was similar to that of the
previous stabilization attempts, that is, there was an inertial component to inflation. But
there were also fundamental differences in the plans. First, the domestic and international
conditions were particularly favourable. On the one hand, there was large international
financial liquidity at the time, which reduced the external sector constraints. On the other
hand, trade and capital liberalization, privatization and other market reforms were in
place, which helped to discipline price formation, attract foreign capital, and to provide
extra revenues for the state.
Second, there was recognition that fiscal discipline was critical for the success of
stabilization. Indeed, in a low inflationary environment, fiscal disequilibrium soon
becomes apparent, and only a new fiscal regime could sustain the Plano Real.M a j o r
fiscal reforms were desperately needed at the time, and these required constitutional
amendments and subsequently strong political support. Reforms in areas such as the
public pension system, social security funding, transfers of funds and division of spending
among federal and state authorities, among others, were bringing about the collapse in
public finance.
In spite of authorities’ commitment to fiscal discipline and to the implementation of the
reforms needed, the fiscal accounts went from an operational surplus of 1.14 per cent of
GDP in 1994 to a deficit of 5 per cent in 1995. The deterioration of public accounts
continued, reaching an operational deficit of 7.4 per cent of GDP in 1998 (see Figure 8).
Amann and Baer (2000) argue that the government’s soft approach to fiscal discipline
resulted, on the one hand, from the failure of President Cardoso to secure the fiscal
reforms in the Congress, reflecting the unwillingness of his fragile political coalition to
cut spending, and on the other hand, from the outcome of the president’s relentless pursuit
of the constitutional amendment to allow his re-election. This amendment demanded such
intense political negotiations and bargaining that it eventually changed the political
agenda, thus delaying fiscal reforms.
In view of the worsening of fiscal accounts, the Plano Real became contingent largely on
the role of the exchange rate for maintaining price stability. Interest rates were
increasingly used to attract foreign capital, aiming at keeping the exchange rate anchor
(see Figure 9).14 Of course, this regime was unsustainable, especially because the high
interest rates were having negative effects on the fiscal accounts, causing severe fiscal
disequilibria. Figure 10 shows that the public sector’s interest payments jumped from
3 per cent of GDP in 1993 to 5 per cent in 1995.
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In the external sector, there was a substantial deterioration in the current account
resulting from various factors. First, the use of the exchange rate as an anchor to keep
inflation down, along with high foreign capital inflows, appreciated the real, causing a
trade balance disequilibrium (see Figure 4).15 Second, there was a substantial increase
in interest and dividend payments between 1994 and 1998, reaching 4 per cent of GDP
in 1997. Third, after decades of strong protection, the rapid trade liberalization led to
high growth in imports. At the same time, post-stabilization consumption, investment
booms and the expansionist fiscal policy stimulated the growth of imports even further.
As a result, the current account increased from a deficit of US$1.8 billion in 1994 to a
deficit of US$18.4 billion in 1995. The deficit has worsened since then, reaching
US$33.5 billion in 1998 (see Figure 11).
15 In the first months of the Plano Real the exchange rate experienced a huge appreciation mainly as a
result of the anchor policy, reaching 0.81 real per dollar (see Figure 3).26
Indeed, the Plano Real was being sustained at the expense of increasing deterioration of
the fiscal and external accounts, compounding what later would bring very serious
difficulties to output growth and social indicators. The gradualist policy adopted to tackle
the growing macroeconomic imbalances can be explained by the easy access to portfolio
capital and increasing FDI inflow. Thus, the FDI-to-current account ratio in 1995 was 24
per cent; increasing to 46 per cent in 1996; and to 62 per cent in 1997; reaching 86 per
cent in 1998. Of course, this strategy could not last long as the increasing dependency on
foreign capital to finance the explosive current account deficits made the economy highly
vulnerable to external shocks and eventually to speculative attacks.
The Mexican crisis in March 1995 began to bring up uncertainties about the sustainability
of the Plano Real. In order to protect the real, the government adopted a tight monetary
policy. Thus, in the aftermath of the Asian crisis in October 1997 the annualized interest
rate reached 42 per cent (see Figure 9). In view of the widespread concerns over the
macroeconomic indicators and increasing fears of the devaluation of the real,t h e
government was forced to take action with regard to the fiscal deficit and to the
appreciated exchange rate. Public spending was cut in 1998, generating some
improvement in the primary result, while the exchange rate was depreciated by 6 real
percentage points.
The Russian crisis in August 1998 forcefully exposed the contradictions of the Plano Real
and made the situation unsustainable. The government substantially raised interest rates in
a dramatic attempt to maintain the exchange anchor in place, but the measure was useless,
as investors increasingly believed that a strong devaluation of the real was inevitable. As
a result, they started withdrawing funds in large quantities from the country. Between
August and September 1998, Brazil lost about US$30 billion in international reserves.
The desperate increases in interest rates to save the real in 1997 and 1998 affected the
public accounts, causing public sector interest payments to reach an astonishing 7.5 per
cent of GDP in 1998 (see Figure 10).
In view of the increasing risk of collapse of the economy, the IMF, the World Bank and
the US government announced a large emergency loan of US$41.5 billion to Brazil. In
October 1998, just after the re-election of President Cardoso, the government proposed
major fiscal reforms to the Congress in a desperate attempt to avoid economic collapse.
By December, the Congress had approved only part of the proposed reforms, raising the
expectations of imminent default. Indeed, capital outflows accelerated, depleting
international reserves at about US$1 billion a day during the first days of January 1999. In
a dramatic and desperate move, the government was forced to allow the exchange rate to
float freely in mid-January. This caused the real to overshoot, jumping from 1.21 before
devaluation to 2.06 by February 1999. The devaluation brought immediate changes to the
external accounts. Trade deficit diminished rapidly as a result of major cuts in imports, a
drastic drop in international travel, 50 per cent profits cuts, and other remittances.
Stringent fiscal measures were taken in 1999. The Congress approved a tax raise, and
since the government was keen to meet the budget primary surplus stipulated by the IMF
agreement, an inflation target system was introduced, and the interest rate was kept high.
However, by the end of the year, the budget surplus attained was larger than the IMF
requirement, and a fiscal policy regime that would prevail during the entire second
administration of President Cardoso was inaugurated. Further fiscal measures were
introduced over the next years, giving rise to a rapid reduction of the operational deficit
(see Figure 8).27
Between 2000 and 2002, a series of external factors adversely affected the economic
performance of Brazil. Concerns and speculations on the prospects of recovery were
renewed. First, the moratorium and deepening of Argentina’s crisis—one of Brazil’s main
trade partners—heavily affected exports. Second, the downturn of the US economy had
an adverse impact on the world economy. Third, there were major declines in FDI
inflows. Fourth, an unprecedented energy crisis developed because of draught (almost all
power generation in the country is hydraulic-based) and the paucity of investments. The
result was severe rationing of electricity.
The weak performance of the economy in 2001, the poor post-devaluation export growth,
and the falling inflow of foreign capital increased anxiety that, similar to Argentina, Brazil
might default. As a consequence, there was a substantial reduction in international
financing, which led to strong exchange rate depreciations and increased volatility. The
exchange rate volatility and the high interest rates affected both the long-term private
investments and fiscal accounts, as a substantial amount of the public debt was dollar
denominated. The exchange rate rises affected inflation through both the elevation of the
costs of imported inputs, and through increased utility prices. Utilities had been pegged to
a price index which was very sensitive to exchange rate movements. The macroeconomic
deterioration led to further interest rate hikes, thus reducing the chances of an eventual
economic recovery.
In 2002, the prospects that the leftist candidate in the upcoming presidential elections,
Lula da Silva, could win kindled uncertainties once again. There were concerns of a
socialist regime and unsound policies and the country-risk ratings soared to
unprecedented levels, bringing additional difficulties to companies and public accounts.
One impact of the Plano Real for public finance was the sharp growth of the public
debt-to-GDP-ratio (see Figure 12), in spite of the substantial rise in the tax
burden-to-GDP-ratio from 25 per cent to 35 per cent, and privatization. This would have
sizeable consequences for economic activity in the following years.
Figure 12




























































































































































An examination of the structural reforms undertaken by Brazil in the 1990s suggests
enormous economic policy changes. In a few years, Brazil moved from an economy that
was quite closed, strongly regulated, and public-enterprise dominated to one that was
more open and market-oriented. The sectoral shifts and social costs incurred were
undeniably high, and an obvious question that arises is whether all this effort paid-off in
terms of sustainable growth and improved well-being for the population. The next
session sheds some light on this issue, by assessing the impacts the reforms had on
social indicators and output growth
4 The impact of reforms on social indicators and economic growth
In order to assess the impacts of reforms on poverty, inequality and output growth, this
paper brings together a number of empirical findings on reforms that are already
available for Brazil. Before going into detail, we briefly present the developments of
poverty, inequality, and economic growth before and after policy changes. Figure 13
presents the share of population under the poverty and indigence lines.16 A significant
drop in poverty occurred just after the Plano Real in mid-1994, and since then the
indigence and poverty lines have remained fairly stable. Figure 14 shows the Gini and
Theil-T income inequality indices. Despite the various phases of stop-and-go, economic
crises, hyperinflation, price and wage freezes, and structural reforms, inequality also
remained stable post-reforms. A preliminary look at these social indicators suggests that
structural reforms so far have hardly benefited the poor.17
Figure 13


































































16 The poverty and indigence lines are constructed on basis of the families’ financial capacity to provide
a minimum number of calories per capita per day in accordance with the FAO standard. The years
missing in series are due to lack of data.
17 Ferreira and Barros (1999) show that although the poverty and inequality indices of 1976 and 1996
were virtually the same, educational, demographic and labour market changes took place in such a
way that they off-set each other, thus accounting for the income inequality stability. They find,









































































































































Figure 15 shows the per capita growth rate. The dotted line is the quadratic trend of the
per capita output growth. While the instantaneous rate of growth of the per capita output
in 1964-79 was 5.7 per cent, it declined sharply to 0.7 per cent in 1980-02, and in 1994-
2002 it reached a disappointing 0.64 per cent. The figure shows that the structural
reforms implemented in the 1990s were not able to reverse the long-term trend of
declining output growth.
Figure 16 presents the fitted and actual logarithm of the per capita output. The fitted line
can be interpreted as the long-term trend of the per capita output. Two points seem to
emerge. First, taking the fitted line as a reference, Brazil has experienced long economic
cycles over the last decades. Second, after a strong boom, the economy entered a rather
stagnant period since 1980, and the fitted-actual gap has been increasing since 1990,
suggestive of an economic depression. The poor economic performance in the post-
reform period implies that something went wrong, as market-oriented reforms are, a
priori, understood to be pro-growth.30
Figure 16
Ln per capita output
Source: Ipeadata.
4.1 Impacts of reforms on poverty and inequality
In 1990-2002, the labour market indicators experienced significant change. By 2002,
more than 50 per cent of the labour force was employed in the informal sector;
unemployment was about 11.7 per cent; and real average wage had lost 15 per cent of
its purchase power, as compared with 1997. The causes of such deterioration are
certainly associated with the country’s mediocre economic growth, but also perhaps
with the reforms undertaken in the past decade. This section brings evidence on whether
and how the structural reforms have favoured the poor.
The empirical literature analysing the impact of trade liberalization on wage distribution
in Brazil reveals that the observed effects are different from those predicted by the HOS
theory. Arbache, Dickerson and Green (2004a) find that wages in the traded sector,
when allowing for human capital, were substantially reduced by the increased degree of
openness after liberalization. This is consistent with the view that the reforms raised the
degree of competition in the traded industries and thereby reduced rents. Menezes-Filho
and Arbache (2003) and Arbache (2000) find that the fall in rents reduced the
bargaining power of workers, as the drop in union wage premium was steeper in the
more open industries. Soares (2004) finds evidence that trade openness narrowed the
gap between formal and informal wages in manufacturing, which was interpreted as a
result of the drop in rents that had been accrued by formal-sector workers before trade
liberalization.
Arbache, Dickerson and Green (2004a) also find that increased openness had different
effects across education groups and within sectors. Across the entire economy, the
marginal returns to education were lower in the post-liberalization period than the
pre-liberalization period, with the exception of the college-educated workers, for whom31
the marginal return increased. Within the traded sector, increased openness was
associated with lower wages, but the downward impact of openness on wages was
insignificant for the two highest education levels, i.e., completed secondary and college
education. Green, Dickerson and Arbache (2001) show that the increase to returns on
the part of college education was not accompanied by a slowdown in the share of
college-educated workers in the labour force. On the contrary, it increased overtime.
Using a supply-demand framework, Green, Dickerson and Arbache show that there was
a relative increase in the relative demand for this group, which is consistent with
changes in the labour demand structure. These results suggest that the developments
after trade and capital liberalization were skill-biased.
As the compression of margins tends to reflect increased competition in the domestic
market, the above results can probably be explained by the introduction of new
technology, rationalization of production, better management, outsourcing, and
turnover. For instance, Arbache (2004) finds that the manufacturing industries that
benefited from more FDI flows in the 1990s also showed higher growth of human
capital, suggesting technological upgrade. Arbache and De Negri (2003) find evidence
that export firms employ workers with better skills than their non-exporting
counterparts, a fact which indicates technological differential. Hay (2001) finds
evidence of compressed profits and market shares in manufacturing firms in the
aftermath of trade openness. Muendler (2004) finds that tougher competition in
domestic markets after openness forced the least efficient manufacturing firms to exit,
or induced firms to adopt more efficient productive methods. He finds however only
little evidence of technological upgrade. López-Córdova and Moreira (2003) also find
that foreign competition pushed manufacturing firms to improve efficiency.
Arbache and Corseuil (2004) and Arbache, Dickerson and Green (2004b) find no
evidence of significant trade-induced employment or wage structure changes in favour
of labour-intensive industries and low-wage industries, as suggested by the HOS model.
Arbache and De Negri (2003) find evidence that a learning-by-exporting effect takes
place within, but not between industries. López-Córdova and Moreira (2003) find that
efficiency gains among exporters are mainly the result of intra-firm and intra-industry
reallocation changes. Menezes-Filho and Rodrigues (2001) find that most of the labour
demand changes observed after liberalization were intra- but not between-industry.
According to López-Córdova and Moreira, most of the productivity gains in
manufacturing resulted from intra-industry and intra-firm reallocation effects. Possible
explanations for the limited reallocation of resources among industries after openness
are turnover within industry, high training costs, high labour dismissal costs, and above
all, the rapid pace of reforms, which may have discouraged adequate adaptation to the
new economic environment by firms and workers.
Green, Dickerson and Arbache (2001) show, with a wage inequality decomposition
analysis, that the changes in inequality over the 1980-1990 period were mostly
associated with changes within education-group inequality. The post-liberalization
change in the relative wages of different education groups had no substantial effect on
the overall wage inequality, for the reason that from the mid-1980s onwards there was a
rise in the relative wage of illiterates, which was a reflection of the drop in their share
on the workforce. The increased returns for college-educated workers were not
sufficient enough to affect overall inequality significantly because this group constitutes
a small proportion of the labour force.32
Maia and Arbache (2001) use input-output techniques to investigate the sources of
employment changes and find that imports accounted for the destruction of 1.97 million
jobs; and technological changes eliminated 4.9 million jobs between 1985 and 1995. A
further decomposition shows that imports of consumption goods and inputs accounted
for 89 per cent of the total job destruction due to imports, while, labour productivity
improvement explains 60 per cent of total job destruction resulting from technological
changes. Ceteris paribus, without the imports and technological changes, unskilled jobs
would have risen another 12.5 per cent. A different picture emerges for skilled jobs.
While no imports would have created 3.8 per cent of additional jobs, no technological
changes would have prevented the generation of 15.8 per cent more jobs, a figure far
larger than that of job loss resulting from imports, thus producing net job creation for
skilled workers. Carneiro and Arbache (2003) use CGE analyses to simulate the impact
of closing the economy in 1996 to reflect the 1990 tariff structure. They find that
unemployment went down and the average household income went up, thus suggesting
that openness contributed to greater unemployment. Overall, the above results offer no
evidence that trade and capital liberalization benefited unskilled workers and improved
income inequality.
Mota (2003) runs a cost-benefit analysis to evaluate the impacts of privatization of the
electricity supply. She finds that most efficiency gains from privatization went to the
benefit of the producers. This is explained partly by the slow establishment of the
regulatory framework, and partly by the regulators’ consent to the outcome. Danni
(2004) examines the privatization of communications and energy to determine whether
these increased provision expanded service coverage in favour of the poor.18 His results
show that provision of fixed phone lines and distribution of energy increased after
privatization and that the poor were the main beneficiaries, as coverage increased
proportionally more among those at the bottom end of the income scale. While 1.1 per
cent of individuals at the lowest income decile had access to fixed telephone lines in
1992, this had raised to 11 per cent by 2002. Individuals at the second lowest decile also
enjoyed a substantial raise in access, from 1.4 per cent to 17 per cent. By 2002, 50 per
cent of all households had fixed phone lines versus 20 per cent in 1998. Thus, it seems
that increased coverage after privatization played a role in improving the well-being of
the poor.19 In the case of energy, provision for the lowest decile rose from 58 per cent
in 1992 to 85 per cent in 2002; consumers at the second lowest decile also experienced a
rise in provision, and coverage rose from 74 per cent to 91 per cent in the same period.
The highest income deciles had negligible or no improvement, as they had already been
covered by energy provision. Danni (2004) argues that it is unclear whether
privatization has resulted in higher energy provision among the poor, since the growth
rate of coverage per income decile has been relatively constant pre- and post-
privatization.
As far as affordability is concerned, there were substantial price changes in utilities in
the post-privatization period. Fiani (2002) shows that the residential energy cost was
subjected to a 40 per cent rise above the CPI between 1995 and 2002, while the industry
18 Danni et al. (2003) show that access of households to public services in Brazil is largely associated
with family per capita income.
19 The availability of proper water and sanitation is still limited among the very poor families. This
sector is mostly under state control.33
energy cost dropped 60 per cent below the industrial price index (IGP).20 The fixed
billing charge for energy distribution and fixed residential telephone connections also
increased sharply after privatization, imposing a regressive cost on the poor.21 As a
result, the share of utilities in the budget of the poor may have risen after privatization.
Anuatti-Neto et al. (2003) show that privatization had a significant impact on
employment at plant level. The average number of employees in privatized plants
dropped 25 per cent. In the case of electricity distribution companies, the labour force
was halved after privatization (Mota 2003). These results suggest that privatization had
both positive and negative effects on poverty. Further empirical investigation, however,
is needed to indicate the net effects of privatization on the poor.
It has been shown that the acceleration of inflation in the 1980s contributed to rising
poverty and inequality (Ferreira and Litchfield 1999; Barros et al. 2000), thus
suggesting that macroeconomic stabilization does induce benefits for the poor. In the
aftermath of the Plano Real, consumption experienced an unprecedented boom. From
the second quarter of 1994 to the second quarter of 1995, consumption rose by 16 per
cent, mainly a reflection of the purchasing-power gains of the lower income groups. As
they had no or very limited access to mechanisms to protect their consumption from
inflation, stabilization gave them a one-time real income raise. Workers at the lowest
income decile experienced a 100 per cent rise in income in the first year of the Plano
Real, while workers at the second lowest decile enjoyed a 46 per cent rise (Rocha
2000). The euphoria of post-Plano Real, accompanied by pro-growth fiscal policies,
fuelled the average growth rate during 1994 and 1995 to 5 per cent, and reduced
unemployment. The post-stabilization boom of the non-financial service sectors also
triggered job creation for low-income groups. These changes had an immediate positive
impact on poverty, but only a very small impact on inequality, as shown in Figures 13
and 14. Thus, the proportion of people below the poverty line fell from 42 per cent in
1993 to 34 per cent in 1995, remaining at this level thereafter.
To sum up, there has been no empirical evidence so far to indicate that trade and capital
liberalization favoured unskilled workers. The destruction of unskilled jobs because of
imports and labour productivity gains (caused in part by the rationalization of
production and turnover) and the low per capita output growth may help to explain the
unemployment and possibly also the increases observed in the informal section in the
1990s.22 Nevertheless, the increased demand for skilled workers did not affect the
inequality indicators, an observation which may be explained by the changes in the
composition of the workforce. The post-privatization expansion of utility coverage
certainly contributed to the improved well-being of the poor. But utility prices appear to
have increased relatively more for the poor, however. The stabilization of inflation was
a permanent benefit for the poor, and may help to explain the post-1994 stability of
poverty and inequality indices.
20 Fiani (2002) quotes a study of Ildo Sauer that shows that low-consumption households (less than 30
kwh per month) had energy price rises of more than 1,000 per cent between 1994 and 2002. Given
that part of the poor are below this threshold, they have experienced a heavy price rise.
21 Between 1999 and July 2003, the fixed telephone bill rose 148 per cent, while the CPI rose 52 per
cent, and the pulse rate rose 65 per cent (Carta Capital, No. 248, 9 July 2003).
22 Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) find no direct evidence to support the theory that openness explains the
informality rise in the 1990s.34
4.2 Impacts of reforms on economic growth
Figure 17 shows that labour productivity in the manufacturing sector rose steadily in the
1990s, reversing the downward trend observed in the 1980s. TFP estimations also show
a similar pattern. Ferreira and Rossi (2003) find average TFP growth rates in
manufacturing industries of -3.8 per cent in 1985-90, and 2.7 per cent in 1991-97.
Muendler (2004) also finds a similar picture, and shows that TFP of manufacturing
firms grew 5 per cent between 1990 and 1998, after a 2 per cent drop over the 1986-90
period. The improvement in efficiency indicators from the turn of the decade is worth
mentioning, and suggests that structural reforms did work to modernize the economy,
thus eventually contributing to GDP growth. This section presents evidence on this
matter.
Trade liberalization and deregulation of foreign capital seem to have had sizeable
impacts on efficiency. Technology transfers and diffusion from abroad rose from 0.04
per cent of GDP in 1990 to 0.35 per cent in 1999—these are close to the OECD average
of 0.4 per cent of GDP. The ratio of payments for technology transfers abroad per GDP
in 1999 increased 8.5 times as compared to 1990. New methods of production and
management were introduced, which led to an increase in the variety of goods, and
improvements in quality. More ISOs and other international certifications were awarded
to Brazilian companies. Thus, from 1990 to 1999 the growth rate of ISO 9000 series
certification was 65 per cent per year, an unambiguous indication of the widespread
diffusion of technology.
The removal of domestic and international barriers to trade and investment seems to
explain the TFP boost in the 1990s. Ferreira and Rossi (2003) find evidence that the fall
of tariffs and import penetration increased TFP growth in manufacturing industries. Hay
(2001) analyses a set of large manufacturing firms and finds that there was substantial
productivity growth after openness. He provides evidence to suggest that a fall in profits
and market shares pushed firms to better performance and greater efficiency gains.
Muendler (2004) investigates TFP change and finds that the removal of tariffs and
import penetration induced firms to rationalize, and forced less competitive firms to exit
Figure 17

































































































the market, thus leading to the rise in TFP. He does not find evidence of technical
change being a significant driving-force for TFP growth. López-Córdova and Moreira
(2003) also investigate the impact of openness on productivity gains and find evidence
indicating that firms were more exposed to international competition and learning-by-
exporting, a fact which would explain the TFP growth in the 1990s. They note that the
productivity gains of traded industries were more than double those of non-traded
industries. Arbache and De Negri (2003) observe that exporting-firms have significantly
higher labour productivity and employ a more skilled labour force than comparable non-
exporting firms. In the vein of the Lucas’ (1988) model, Sarquis and Arbache (2003)
find evidence that trade openness and technology diffusion substantially enhanced the
external effects of human capital in the post-liberalization era, thus contributing to the
explanation on TFP growth. These results suggest that the efficiency improvements
observed in the manufacturing sector in the 1990s are strongly related to the new trade
and foreign capital policies.
Anuatti-Neto et al. (2003) assess the impacts of privatization on efficiency and the
output of former SOEs, and find indications of increased profitability and reduced
operating costs. They also find there was a fall in the investment-to-sale ratio and net
taxes-to-sale ratio, as privatized companies had enjoyed various forms of subsidies.
Danni (2004) shows that the provision of utilities and services grew after privatization.
For instance, the number of fixed phone lines rose from 20 million in 1998 to 45 million
in 2002; and the number of mobile phones rose from 5.6 million to 35 million in the
same period. Carvalho (2001) observes that the privatization programme had various
beneficial effects: improvement in the managerial practices and in the efficiency of
enterprises remaining under state ownership; reduction of public debt, albeit much less
than anticipated earlier; re-organization of public finances of the federative states; and
reduction of public debt interest payments in the short and long run, versus the levels
they would have been in the absence of privatization. Finally, the privatization
programme attracted about US$50 billion in FDI inflows. Overall, the empirical
evidence suggests that the privatization of SOEs enhanced efficiency, increased the
provision of utilities, improved the government’s fiscal position, and contributed to
alleviating the balance-of-payments pressures.
The 1990s witnessed the dismantling of a huge state regulatory system. Pricing setup in
several sectors, barriers to entry in traded and services sectors, subsidies, and a heavy
bureaucratic system, were all removed, making the economy more efficient and less
costly. Modernization of the anti-trust laws and the establishment of regulators in the
infrastructure and utilities sectors have, in conjunction with privatization, contributed to
making the economy more market-oriented and consumer-focused.
Although structural reforms seem to have had substantial impacts on economic
efficiency, post-reform output growth decomposition results are cause for concern.
Pinheiro (2003) finds a TFP growth of 1.8 per cent over the period 1981-93 to 1994-
2002. Despite a significant recovery of productivity (from -0.7 to 1.1), output growth
after reforms was only 1.1 per cent, going from 1.6 per cent to 2.7 per cent. The main
explanation for this disappointing figure is the poor capital accumulation growth, which
fell from 1.3 per cent in 1981-93 to 1.1 per cent in 1994-2002, while labour factor
growth dropped -0.6 per cent. Thus, TFP gains account for all post-reform output
growth.36
4.3 Conclusions
The empirical results reviewed above suggest that trade and capital liberalization did not
benefit the poorer population and unskilled workers. It seems that increasing
competition in an economy which had previously been fairly closed, reduced rents and
forced firms to adapt, causing job losses and a reduction in real wages. Despite this,
these findings are somewhat unexpected, considering that the Brazilian labour force is
largely composed of uneducated and untrained workers. The timing and pace of reforms
may contribute to explaining these outcomes. Several other countries with similar
comparative advantage adopted similar reforms, and the rapid pace of changes may not
have permitted firms and workers to adapt adequately to the new economic framework.
This would have limited the reallocation of resources, at least in the short and medium
term. Inflation stabilization, however, brought immense benefits for the poor, thus
contributing to the reduction in inequality and poverty levels.
Despite the modernization of the economy associated with the policy changes, the
average growth rate of the post-reform period was 2.7 per cent, higher than the 1981-93
figure of 1.6 per cent, but still far below the historical rate of 6.5 per cent. A
decomposition of the output growth shows that (i) if TFP growth had not increased, the
economy would have experienced a sharp depression in the post-reform period; and
(ii) the reforms did not improve investment. The investment-to-GDP ratio remained at
around 16 per cent. The stagnation in investments is somewhat puzzling, as openness,
privatization, stabilization and deregulation of markets are often assumed to reduce the
prices of investment goods and create business opportunities, the elements needed to
encourage capital accumulation. In fact, the evidence for Brazil suggests that structural
reforms seem to be conducive to growth, but do not cause growth. This result is perhaps
relevant for policymakers in developing countries who seem to take it for granted that
reforms will induce growth. The slow post-reform output growth helps to explain the
stability of poverty and inequality indicators. The next session reviews these issues and
tries to answer the question why structural reforms in Brazil have yet to deliver, as was
expected.
5 W h a tw e n tw r o n g ?
It seems that the disappointing post-reform output growth is explained by the
sequencing of policy reform issues, political economy constraints, and the timing when
the reforms were introduced. One critical sequencing issue is the fact that the
stabilization-cum-exchange rate nominal anchor was introduced after, and not before,
trade liberalization, hence in opposition to the long-established consensus of policy
literature. The appreciation of the exchange rate prior to stabilization made the anti-
export bias created by the nominal anchor larger than it would have been otherwise. It
was subsequently reinforced by the long period of appreciation after Plano Real.T h e
sizeable FDI inflow favoured by capital account liberalization and privatization in the
aftermath of Plano Real also contributed to keeping the real appreciated. As
productivity increases take time to materialize and the reallocation of resources is a
slow and long process (especially in a country such as Brazil that had been long
protected from imports), the trade-off between the exchange rate used to steer inflation
down and to guide the reallocation of resources was counterproductive for improving
exports. The obvious outcome was a rapid worsening of the current accounts, which37
ultimately constrained the output growth potential. Unfortunately, Brazil repeated the
earlier policy mistakes made by other Latin American countries in their stabilization
attempts, as documented by Sebastian Edwards, but with the aggravated implications of
inducing a stagnant economic cycle, and exposing the economy to speculative attacks in
a liberalized financial market framework.
Another critical issue of policy reform coordination is related to fiscal accounts. Serious
fiscal adjustment was left until after stabilization. Thus, the fiscal adjustment required in
the aftermath of the Plano Real was huge and difficult to implement. It appears that the
government overestimated its capacity to control fiscal accounts and to have the
Congress pass fiscal reforms in such a short time. Instead of surpluses, the post-Plano
Real period witnessed explosive operational public deficits, revealing the inconsistency
of fiscal budgets in the inflationary era. The rise in interest rates to finance
balance-of-payment deficits with portfolio capital affected public accounts and
aggravated the fiscal disequilibria. The unwillingness of politicians to adopt the
measures necessary to achieve fiscal discipline delayed the essential reforms, and added
to the costs of adjustment. At the time, the ‘way out’ for fiscal adjustment was not to
rely on inflation tax, as had been done in previous decades, but to take advantage of the
success of Plano Real to resort to obtain funding from both local and foreign financial
markets, at the cost of worsening fiscal and current accounts.
It is worthy of note that fiscal measures were taken only after the aggravation of
economic crisis, the collapse of the real, and the depletion of international reserves. The
recurrent postponement of reforms highlights the stringent war of attrition, and suggests
that Brazil is perhaps a good illustration of the point made by Danny Rodrik on how the
combination of high income inequality and weakness of conflict management
institutions can be counterproductive for a society attempting to manage and adequately
respond to macroeconomic problems.23
The rapid pace at which the structural reforms were introduced in Brazil was perhaps a
policymaker reaction to the anticipated strong pressures against policy changes. Hasty
reforms are, however, costly because the chances of mistakes increase, and short-run
unemployment and bankruptcy go up and tend to be unevenly distributed.
The delay of fiscal adjustment and conflicts over policy reforms created an atmosphere
of unsustainable macroeconomic deterioration in the country. This, of course, could not
last long. Accordingly, the spread of C-Bonds—the risk premium on Brazilian
government international bonds—had jumped from 400 base points in October 1997 to
1150 base points by the end of 1998.
The rising uncertainties about the sustainability of the Plano Real had stringent effects
on the prospects of growth. From the end of 1997 onwards, the investment-to-GDP ratio
triggered a period of contraction, and was one immediate cause of vulnerability of the
real. After the collapse of the real in the early 1999, the rising costs of investment and
input goods, the very high interest rates, the implementation of an enormous fiscal
adjustment, and the unfinished regulatory system for utilities and infrastructure, added
23 One illustration of the war of attrition and polarization in Brazil is the impact of labour unions on
income inequality. Arbache (1999, 2001b) shows that labour union policies increase, rather than
decrease, wage inequality, a result that is at odds with the role they are supposed to play.38
to the main causes of investment stagnation. Thus, the average output growth was 1.7
per cent between 1998 and 2002; per capita output growth was nearly zero.
The timing at which Brazil implemented structural reforms also appears to have
contributed to their effectiveness. On the one hand, many potential competitors
introduced similar reforms, while on the other hand institutional constraints to pro-
export policies, along with developed-country protectionism, eroded the benefits reform
was expected to bring for output growth. In addition, Brazil was in an extended period
of economic stagnation. Naturally, in such an environment, the efforts needed to
promote growth should have extended much beyond the introduction of the standard
market-oriented reforms, thus emphasizing the challenge faced by developing countries
in their attempts to achieve sustainable economic growth. Finally, the economic
recession faced by Brazil’s important trade partners (Mercosur and other Latin
American countries) and the slowdown of the world economy frustrated export growth
in the early 2000s.
Although our explanations on what went wrong in Brazil are tentative, it appears that
the delay of fiscal reforms and mismanagement of policies contributed decisively to
offsetting reform’s potential benefits to output growth, at least in the short and medium
term. Given that political economy issues have an effect on reform postponements and
policy design, policies that aim for sustainable growth need to tackle the sources of
political economy constraints in Brazil. An obvious starting point is the reduction of
poverty and inequality.
6 Final remarks
Over the last twenty years, Brazil has undergone several attempts to improve
sustainable growth through stabilization programmes, and more recently, structural
reforms in line with the Washington Consensus Agenda. The results, however, have
been disappointing, as per capita output growth has been below its historic trend, and
poverty and inequality remain high. A considerable concern over the implication of
successive failures is the reform fatigue of the society. It is also unclear whether the
never-ending economic and political crises will trigger disillusionment with the young
re-democratization process and with Brazil’s future.
The main lesson of Brazil’s attempt at economic reform is that policies which attempt to
promote growth and tackle poverty have to overcome domestic economic and
institutional constraints. If the standard market-oriented reforms had been adequate to
boost growth, Brazil would have grown at higher rates. Therefore, it can be said that
market reforms are not a panacea. Market reforms may contribute to growth, but only if
supported with microeconomic policies tailor-made to address a country’s needs, and
with appropriate macroeconomic, institutional and political environments. Given that no
autarkic country has been able to maintain high growth performance for a long period, it
seems proper to consider market reforms as necessary, but not sufficient condition, for
sustainable growth.
Finally, two empirical findings reviewed above call for attention. First, TFP growth in
the 1990s is better explained by a trade-induced push and the exit of the least
competitive firms, and less by new technologies; and second, relative wages of skilled39
workers rose sensibly, even at low output growth rates. Both findings are associated
with one common factor—the very low level of average human capital in Brazil.24 If
the goal is to achieve and sustain high growth rates and to improve poverty and
inequality indicators, it seems that additional investments in human capital are essential.
References
Alesina, A., and A. Drazen (1991). ‘Why are Stabilizations Delayed?’. American
Economic Review, 81: 1170-88.
Amann, E., and W. Baer (2000). ‘The Illusion of Stability: The Brazilian Economy
under Cardoso’. World Development, 28: 1805-19.
Anuatti-Neto, F., M. Barossi-Filho, A. G. Carvalho, and R. Macedo (2003). ‘Costs and
Benefits of Privatization: Evidence from Brazil’. Latin American Research Network
Working Papers No. R-455. São Paulo: IADB.
Arbache, J. S. (1999). ‘Do Unions always Decrease Wage Dispersion? The Case of
Brazilian Manufacturing’. Journal of Labor Research, 20: 425-36.
Arbache, J. S. (2000). ‘Does Trade Liberalisation Always Decrease Unions Bargaining
Power?’. Paper presented at the 2000 EALE/SOLE World Conference in Milan.
Arbache, J. S. (2001a). ‘Liberalização commercial e mercado de trabalho no Brasil’, in
N. Menezes e M. Lisbo’, Microeconomia Aplicada no Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Contra
Capa / Fundação Getúlio Vargas.
Arbache, J. S. (2001b). ‘The Impact of Unions in Brazilian Labor Market’. Washington,
DC: World Bank. Mimeo.
Arbache, J. S. (2002). ‘Trade Liberalization and Wages in Developing Countries:
Theory and Evidence’, in A. Levy and J. R. Faria (eds), Economic Growth,
Inequality and Migration: National and International Perspectives. Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar.
Arbache, J. S. (2004). ‘The Impacts of Foreign Direct Investments on Labour Market
and Technology in Brazil in the 1990s’. Helsinki: WIDER-UNU. Mimeo.
Arbache, J. S., and C. H. Corseuil (2004). ‘Liberalização comercial e estruturas de
emprego e salário.’ Revista Brasileira de Economia. forthcoming.
Arbache, J. S., and J. A. De Negri (2003). ‘The Determinants of Brazilian
Manufacturing Exports’. Working Paper No. 42-2003. University of Oxford Centre
for Brazilian Studies.
Arbache, J. S., A. Dickerson, and F. Green (2004a). ‘Trade Liberalisation and Wages in
Developing Countries’. Economic Journal, 114: F73-F96.
Arbache, J. S., A. Dickerson, and F. Green (2004b). ‘Assessing the Stability of the
Inter-Industry Wage Structure in the Face of Radical Economic Reforms’.
Economics Letters, 83: 149-55.
24 Brazil has one of the highest adult illiterate rates in Latin America, and one of the lowest average
years of education among middle-income countries.40
Bacha, E. L. (1994). ‘O fisco e a inflação: uma interpretação do caso brasileiro’. Revista
de Economia Política, 14: 5-17.
Barnett, S. (2000). ‘Evidence on the Fiscal and Macroeconomic Impact of
Privatization’. Washington, DC: IMF.
Barros, R. P., C. H. Corseuil, R. Mendonca, and M. C. Reis (2000). ‘Poverty, Inequality
and Macroeconomic Instability’. Ipea Texto para Discussão No. 750. Rio de Janeiro:
Institudo de Pesquisa Economica Aplicada.
Bennett, J., S. Estrin, J. Maw, and G. Urga (2004). ‘Privatization Methods and
Economic Growth’. London: Brunel University. Mimeo.
Berman, E., J. Bound, and S. Machin (1998). ‘Implications of Skill-Biased
Technological Change: International Evidence’. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
113: 1245-79.
Beyer, H., P. Rojas, and R. Vergara (1999). ‘Trade Liberalization and Wage Inequality’.
Journal of Development Economics, 59: 103-23.
Bhagwati, J. (1978). Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: Anatomy and
Consequences of Exchange Rate Controls. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing
Company.
Bhagwati, J., and T. N. Srinivasan (2002). ‘Trade and Poverty in the Poor Countries’.
American Economic Review - Papers and Proceedings, 92: 180-3.
Bruno, M., and W. Easterly (1995). ‘Inflation Crisis and Long-Run Growth’. NBER
Working Paper No. 5209. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Bugarin, M. S., R. Ellery Jr., V. Gomes, and A. Teixeira (2002). ‘The Brazilian
Depression in the 1980s and 1990s’. Paper presented at the 2003 Brazilian
Econometric Society Meeting.
Cagan, P. (1956). ‘The Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinflation’, in M. Friedman (ed.),
Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Calvo, G. A., and C. A. Vegh (1999). ‘Inflation Stabilization and BoP Crises in
Developing Countries’. NBER Working Paper No. 6925. Cambridge, MA: National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Carneiro, F. G., and J. S. Arbache (2003). ‘The Impacts of Trade on the Brazilian Labor
Market: A CGE Model Approach’. World Development, 31: 1581-95.
Carvalho, M. A. S. (2001). ‘Privatização, divida e déficit público no Brasil’. Ipea Texto
para Discussão No. 847. Rio de Janeiro: Institudo de Pesquisa Economica Aplicada.
Central Bank of Brazil. Dataset available at: www.bacen.gov.br .
Chisari, O., A. Estache, and C. Romero (1999). ‘Winners and Losers from Privatization
and Regulation of Utilities: Lessons from a General Equilibrium Model of
Argentina’. World Bank Economic Review, 13: 357-78.
Cook, P., and Y. Uchida (2001). ‘Privatization and Economic Growth in Developing
Countries’. Centre on Regulation and Competition Working Paper Series No. 7.
Manchester: University of Manchester.41
Cragg, M. I., and M. Epelbaum (1996). ‘Why Has Wage Dispersion Grown in Mexico?
Is it Incidence of Reforms or Growing Demand for Skills?’. Journal of Development
Economics, 51: 99-116.
Cukierman, A., S. Edwards, and G. Tabellini (1992). ‘Seignorage and Political
Instability’. American Economic Review, 82: 537-55.
Danni, L. S. (2004). ‘Análise do efeito distributivo das reformas regulatórias e
privatização dos serviços públicos no Brasil’. Brasilia: Universidade de Brasília.
Mimeo.
Danni, L. S., R. C. Farias, P. C. Souza, J. R. Louzada, P. A. Baptista, and S. H.
Bernardes (2003). ‘Diagnóstico da exclusão no acesso aos serviços de energia
elétrica no Brasil’. Tribunal de Contas da União. Mimeo.
Davis, D. R. (1996). ‘Trade Liberalization and Income Distribution’. NBER Working
Paper No. 5693. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
De Gregorio, J. (1996). ‘Inflation, Growth, and Central Banks: Theory and Evidence’.
Policy Research Paper No. 1575. Washington, DC: World Bank.
De Gregorio, J., and J. W. Lee (2003). ‘Growth and Adjustment in East Asia and Latin
America’. Working Paper No. 245. Santiago: Central Bank of Chile.
Dollar, D., and A. Kraay (2004). ‘Trade, Growth, and Poverty’. Economic Journal, 114:
F22-F49.
Edwards, S. (1992). ‘The Sequencing of Structural Adjustment and Stabilization’.
Occasional Paper No. 34. Stockton, CA: International Center for Economic Growth.
Edwards, S. (1993a). ‘Openness, Trade, and Growth in Developing Countries’. Journal
of Economic Literature, 31: 1358-93.
Edwards, S. (1993b). ‘The Political Economy of Inflation and Stabilization in
Developing Countries’. NBER Working Paper No. 4319. Cambridge, MA: National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Edwards, S. (1994a). ‘Macroeconomic Stabilization in Latin America: Recent
Experience and Some Sequencing Issues’. NBER Working Paper No. 4697.
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Edwards, S. (1994b). ‘Trade and Industrial Policy Reform in Latin America’. NBER
Working Paper No. 4772. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Edwards, S. (1997). ‘The Mexican Peso Crises: How Much Did We Know? When Did
We Know It?’. NBER Working Paper No. 6334. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau
of Economic Research
Edwards, S. (1998). ‘Openness, Productivity and Growth: What Do We Really Know?’.
Economic Journal, 108: 383-98.
Estache, A., V. Foster, and Q. Wodon (2002). ‘Accounting for Poverty in Infrastructure
Reform: Learning from Latin America’s Experience’. WBI Development Studies.
Washington, DC: World Bank.42
Feenstra, R. C., and G. Hanson (1995). ‘Foreign Investment, Outsourcing and Relative
W a g e s ’ ,i nR .C .F e e n s t r aa n dG .M .G r o s s m a n( e d s ) ,Political Economy of Trade
Policy: Essays in Honor of Jagdish Bhagwati.C a m b r i d g e ,M A :T h eM I TP r e s s .
Feenstra, R. C., and G. H. Hanson (1997). ‘Foreign Direct Investments and Relative
Wages: Evidence from Mexico’s Maquiladoras’. Journal of International
Economics, 42: 371-94.
Feliciano, Z. M. (2001). ‘Workers and Trade Liberalization: The Impact of Trade
Reforms in Mexico on Wages and Employment’. Industrial and Labor Relations
Review, 95: 95-115.
Fernandes, A. M. (2003). ‘Trade Policy, Trade Volumes and Plant-Level Productivity in
Colombian Manufacturing Industries’. Washington, DC: World Bank. Mimeo.
Ferreira, F. H. G., and R. P. Barros (1999). ‘The Slippery Slope: Explaining the Increase
in Extreme Poverty in Urban Brazil, 1976-1996’. Revista de Econometria, 19:
Ferreira, F. H. G., and J. A. Litchfield (1999). ‘Education or Inflation? The Roles of
Structural Factors and Macroeconomic Instability in Explaining Brazilian Inequality
in the 1980s’. Discussion Paper No DARP 41. London: STICERD-LSE.
Ferreira, P.C., and J. L. Rossi (2003). ‘New Evidence from Brazil on Trade
Liberalization and Productivity Growth’. International Economic Review, 44: 1383-
405.
Fiani, R. (2002). ‘Os desafios da estrutura tarifária’. GESEL-IE-UFRJ.
Fischer, S. (1993). ‘The Role of Macroeconomic Factors in Growth’. Journal of
Monetary Economics, 32: 485-512.
Forteza, A., and M. Rama (2001). ‘Labor Market Rigidity and the Success of Economic
Reforms across more than 100 Countries’. WB Working Paper No. 2521.
Washington, DC: World Bank.
Galli, R., and R. van der Hoeven (2001). ‘Is Inflation Bad for Income Inequality: The
Importance of the Initial Rate of Inflation’. Employment Paper No. 2001/29. Geneva:
ILO.
Goldberg, P. K., and N. Pavcnik (2003). ‘The Response of the Informal Sector to Trade
Liberalization’. Journal of Development Economics, 72: 463-96.
Gonzales-Rozada, M. and A. Menendez (2002). ‘Why Have Poverty and Income
Inequality Increased so much? Argentina 1991-2002’. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University. Mimeo.
Green, F., A. Dickerson, and J. S. Arbache (2001). ‘A Picture of Wage Inequality and
the Allocation of Labour through a Period of Trade Liberalisation: The Case of
Brazil’. World Development, 29: 1923-39.
Grossman, G. M., and E. Helpman (1991a). Innovation and Growth in the Global
Economy.C a m b r i d g e ,M A :T h eM I TP r e s s .
Grossman, G. M., and E. Helpman (1991b). ‘Trade, Knowledge Spillovers and Trade’.
European Economic Review, 35: 517-526.43
Gruber, J. (1997). ‘The Incidence of Payroll Taxation: Evidence from Chile’. Journal of
Labor Economics, 15: S72-S101.
Hansen, N. A. (1997). ‘Privatization, Technological Choice and Aggregate Outcomes’.
Journal of Public Economics, 64: 425-42.
Hanson, G. H., and A. Harrison (1999). ‘Trade Liberalization and Wage Inequality in
Mexico’. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 52: 271-88.
Harrison, A. (1996). ‘Openness and Growth: A Time-Series, Cross-Country Analysis
for Developing Countries’. Journal of Development Economics, 48: 419-47.
Hay, D. (2001). ‘The Post 1990 Brazilian Trade Liberalization and the Performance of
Large Manufacturing Firms: Productivity, Market Share and Profits’. Economic
Journal, 111: 620-41.
Hertel, T. W., P. Preckel, J. Cranfield, and M. Ivanic (2001). ‘Poverty Impacts of
Multilateral Trade Liberalization’. CGTA-DA Working Paper No. 16. West
Lafayette, IN: Purdue University.
Hoffmann, R. (1992). ‘Desigualdade e pobreza no Brasil no período 1979–90, Anais do
XIV Encontro Brasileiro de Econometria’. Campos de Jordão.
Ipeadata. Dataset available at: www.ipeadata.gov.br .
Jonsson, G., and A. Subramanian (1999). ‘Dynamic Gains from Trade: Evidence from
South Africa’. Working Paper No. WP/00/45. Washington, DC: IMF.
Knan, M. S., and R. Zahler (1985). ‘Trade and Financial Liberalization Given External
Shocks and Inconsistent Domestic Policies’. IMF Staff Papers, 32: 22-55.
Krueger, A. O. (1978). ‘Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development:
Liberalization Attempts and Consequences’. NBER Working Paper. Cambridge,
MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Krueger, A. O. (1981). ‘Interaction between Inflation and Trade Regime Objectives in
Stabilization Programs’, in W. Cline and S. Weintraub (eds), Economic Stabilization
in Developing Countries. Washington DC: Brookings Institution.
Krueger, A. O. (1990). ‘The Relationship between Trade, Employment, and
Development’, in G. Ranis and T. Schultz (eds), The State of Development
Economics: Progress and Perspectives. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell.
Krueger, A. O. (1993). Political Economy of Policy Reform in Developing Countries.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Kume, H., G. Piani, and C. F. Souza (2003). ‘A Política brasileira de importação no
período 1987-98: descrição e avaliação’, in C. H. Corseuil and H. Kume (eds), A
Abertura Comercial nos Anos 1990—Impactos Sobre Emprego e Salários. Brasília:
Ministério do Trabalho e Emprego and Ipea.
Lee, J. W. (1996). ‘Government Interventions and Productivity Growth’. Journal of
Economic Growth, 1: 391-414.
Li, H., and H. Zou (2002). ‘Inflation, Growth, and Income Distribution: A Cross-
Country Study’. Annals of Economics and Finance, 3: 85-101.44
Little, I., T. Scitovsky, and M. Scott (1970). Industry and Trade in Some Developing
Countries. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
López-Córdova, E., and M. M. Moreira (2003). ‘Regional Integration and Productivity:
The Experiences of Brazil and Mexico’. Intal-ITD-STA Working Paper No. 14.
Washington, DC: IADB.
Lora, E. (2000). ‘What Makes Reforms Likely? Timing and Sequencing of Structural
Reforms in Latin America’. Research Department Working Paper No. 424.
Washington, DC: IADB.
Lucas, R. E. (1988). ‘On the Mechanics of Economic Development’. Journal of
Monetary Economics, 22: 3-42.
Macedo, R. (2000). ‘Privatization and Distribution of Assets and Income in Brazil’.
Working Paper No. 14. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace.
Maia, K., and J. A. Arbache (2001). ‘O impacto do comércio internacional e da
tecnologia na estrutura de emprego no Brasil’. Mercado de Trabalho—Conjuntura e
Análise, No. 16. Rio de Janeiro: Institudo de Pesquisa Economica Aplicada.
McCulloch, N., L. A. Winters, and X. Cirera (eds) (2001). Trade Liberalization and
Poverty: A Handbook. London: CEPR.
McNab, R. M., and R. E. Moore (1998). ‘Trade Policy, Export Expansion, Human
Capital and Growth’. Journal of International Trade and Economic Development,7 :
237-56.
Menezes-Filho, N., and J. S. Arbache (2003). ‘Trade Liberalization, Product and Labor
Markets in Brazil’. São Paulo: University of São Paulo. Mimeo.
Menezes-Filho, N. A., and M. Rodrigues, Jr., (2001). ‘Abertura, tecnologia e
qualificação: evidências para a manufatura brasileira’. Proceedings of the Workshop
on Trade Liberalization and the Labor Market in Brazil. Brasília: UnB and Rio de
Janeiro: Institudo de Pesquisa Economica Aplicada.
Michaely, M. (1985). ‘The Demand for Protection against Exports of Newly
Industrialized Countries’. Journal of Policy Modeling, 7: 123-32.
Moreira, M. M. (2004). ‘Brazil’s Trade Liberalization and Growth: Has It Failed?’.
INTAL-ITD-IADB Occasional Paper No. 24. Washington, DC: IADB.
Mota, R. L. (2003). ‘The Restructuring and Privatization of Electricity Distribution and
Supply Businesses in Brazil: A Social Cost-Benefit Analysis’. Cambridge:
University of Cambridge. Mimeo.
Muendler, M. A. (2004). ‘Trade, Technology, and Productivity: A Study of the
Brazilian Manufacturers, 1986-1998’. San Diego: University of California. Mimeo.
Özler, S., and G. Tabellini (1991). ‘External Debt and Political Economy Instability’.
NBER Working Paper No. 3772. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Pacheco-López, P., and A. P. Thirlwall (2004). ‘Trade Liberalization in Mexico:
Rhetoric and Reality’. Kent: University of Kent. Mimeo.45
Parente, S. L., and E. C. Prescott (1994). ‘Barriers to Technology Adoption and
Development’. Journal of Political Economy, 102: 298-321.
Parente, S. L., and E. C. Prescott (2000). Barriers to Riches.C a m b r i d g e ,M A :T h eM I T
Press.
Parikh, A. (2002). ‘Impact of Liberalization, Economic Growth and Trade Policies on
Current Accounts of Developing Countries: An Econometric Study’. WIDER
Discussion Paper No. 2002/63. Helsinki: UNU-WIDER.
Pavcnik, N. (2002). ‘Trade Liberalization, Exit, and Productivity Improvement:
Evidence from Chilean Plants’. Review of Economic Studies, 69: 245-76.
Pinheiro, A. C. (2000). ‘The Brazilian Privatization Experience: What’s Next?’.
BNDES Discussion Paper No. 87. Rio de Janeiro: National Economic Development
Bank .
Pinheiro, A. C. (2003). ‘Uma agenda pós-liberal de desenvolvimento para o Brasil’.
Ipea Texto para Discussão No. 989. Rio de Janeiro: Institudo de Pesquisa Economica
Aplicada.
Pinheiro, A. C., and M. M. Moreira (2000). ‘O perfil dos exportadores brasileiros de
manufaturados nos anos 90: quais as implicações de política?’, in P. M. Veiga (org.),
O Brasil e os desafios da globalização. Rio de Janeiro: Relume Dumara.
Pinheiro, A. C., F. Giambiagi, and M. M. Moreira (2001). ‘Brazil in the 1990s: A
Successful Transition?’. NBDES Texto para Discussão No. 91. Rio de Janeiro:
National Economic Development Bank.
Plane, P. (1997). ‘Privatization and Economic Growth: An Empirical Investigation from
a Sample of Developing Countries Markets’. Applied Economics, 29: 161-78.
Quibria, M. G. (2002). ‘Growth and Poverty: Lessons from East Asian Miracle
Revised’. ADB Institute Research Papers No. 33. Tokyo: ADB Institute.
Robbins, D. J., and T. H. Gindling (1999). ‘Trade Liberalization and the Relative Wages
for More-Skilled Workers in Costa Rica’. Review of Development Economics,3 :
140-54.
Rocha, S. (2000). ‘Pobreza e desigualdade no Brasil: O esgotamento dos efeitos
distributivos do Plano Real’. Ipea Texto para Discussão No. 721. Rio de Janeiro:
Institudo de Pesquisa Economica Aplicada.
Rodriguez, F., and D. Rodrik (2000). ‘Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptic’s
Guide to the Cross-National Evidence’, in B. Bernanke and K. Rogoff (eds),
Macroeconomics Annual 2000.C a m b r i d g e ,M A :M I TP r e s sf o rN B E R .
Rodrik, D. (1996). ‘Openness, Trade Liberalization, and Growth in Developing
Countries’. Journal of Economic Literature, 31: 1358-93.
Rodrik, D. (1999). ‘Where Did All the Growth Go? External Shocks, Social conflict,
a n dG r o w t hC o l l a p s e s ’ .Journal of Economic Growth, 4: 385-412.
Rodrik, D. (2000). ‘Development Strategies for the Next Century’. Paper presented at
the Conference on Developing Economies in the 21
st Century, IDE, Chiba, Japan.46
Sanchez-Paramo, C., and N. Schady (2002). ‘Off and Running? Technology, Trade, and
the Rising Demand for Skilled Workers in Latin America’. Washington, DC: World
Bank. Mimeo.
Santos-Paulino, A., and T. Thirlwall (2004). ‘The Impact of Trade Liberalization on
Exports, Imports and Balance of Payments of Developing Countries’. Economic
Journal, 114: F50-F72.
Sarquis, S. J., and J. S. Arbache (2003). ‘Openness and External Effects of Human
Capital’. London: London School of Economics. Mimeo.
Silva, M. L. F., and J. P. Andrade (1996). ‘Brazil’s New Currency: Origin,
Development and Perspectives of the Real’. Revista Brasileira de Economia, 50:
427-67.
Soares, F. V. (2004). ‘The Impact of Trade Liberalization on the Informal Sector in
Brazil’. London: University College London. Mimeo.
Solimano, A., and R. Soto (2003). ‘Latin American Economic Growth in the Late 20th
Century: Evidence and Interpretation’. Santiago: ECLAC. Mimeo.
Thirlwall, A. P., and M. N. Hussain (1982). ‘The Balance of Payments Constraint,
Capital Flows and Growth Rate Differences between Developing Countries’. Oxford
Economic Papers, 10: 498-509.
Urani, A. (1996). ‘Liberalization, Stabilization and Poverty in Latin America during the
1990s’. Ipea Texto para Discussão No. 445. Rio de Janeiro: Institudo de Pesquisa
Economica Aplicada.
Velasco Jr., L. (1999). ‘Privatization: Myths and False Perceptions’. Rio de Janeiro:
National Economic Development Bank. Mimeo.
Williamson, J., and M. Mahar (1998). ‘A Survey of Financial Liberalization’. Essays in
International Finance No. 211. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University.
Wood, A. (1994). North-South Trade, Employment and Inequality - Changing Fortunes
in Skill-Driven World. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Wood, A. (1999). ‘Openness and Wage Inequality in Developing Countries: The Latin
American Challenge to East Asian Conventional Wisdom’, in R. E. Baldwin,
D. Cohen, A. Sapir and A. Venables (eds), Market Integration, Regionalism and
Global the Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
World Bank (various years). The World Development Indicators. Washington, DC:
World Bank.